Blogged by John Gideon, VotersUnite.Org
A Press Release, which is copied in full on the other side of the fold, was just received from Steven Hertzberg, the Project Director of Election Science Institute that exposes the fact that in September election workers in Cuyahoga County, Ohio put every Diebold memory card into laptop computers in order to archive election information. These laptops were found laying around the office and, in some cases, were even brought from home. There is no way to know how many viruses may have now been transferred from these laptops to the memory cards. Luckily this incident was caught on video tape.
This failure on the part of county election officials is exactly the type of failure that Diebold has claimed over and over again cannot happen. In the new release, Prof. Edward Felton of Princeton University and the recent Diebold TS hack, says:
The press release from Princeton and the Election Science Institute is posted in full below…
Ed Felten, Princeton University
Steven Hertzberg, Election Science Institute
For Immediate Release: Thursday, November 02, 2006
Cuyahoga County Ohio Possibly Exposed Election System to Computer Virus
The memory cards that will be used to store votes on Election Day in Cuyahoga County, Ohio were stuck into ordinary laptop computers in September, possibly exposing the county’s election system to a virus infection. This serious security lapse was caught on video through the efforts of Cleveland resident Adele Eisner and Cleveland-area filmmaker Jeffrey Kirkby, who has graciously made his raw footage available on the Internet for personal viewing at:
http://homepage.mac.com/captainkirkby/Data_Crunch/iMovieTheater87.html
Just one month ago a Princeton evoting study (available at http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting) showed that the memory cards used in Diebold touchscreen voting systems could carry computer viruses that would infect voting machines and steal votes on the infected machines.
“Diebold has repeatedly stated that this type of security breach is virtually impossible due to security practices employed by the vendor and election officials,” said Edward Felten, Professor of Computer Science and Public Affairs at Princeton University. “Anyone who watches the video can now see for themselves that a virus could penetrate the election system via tasks performed by election staff.”
The new video shows a group of election workers sitting at tables, each with a laptop computer. An official explains that these laptops were gathered from around the office, and some are the personal laptops of election workers. Each worker has a laptop and a stack of memory cards, and is inserting the memory cards one by one into the laptop. Cuyahoga County officials claim that every one of the county’s memory cards gets this treatment, in order to archive vote records from the May 2006 primary election onto CD-ROMs.
Ordinary laptops are of course vulnerable to computer viruses and other malicious software. Given the number of ordinary laptops in the room, it is reasonably likely that at least one is infected with spyware, a virus, or other malware. This puts at risk the memory cards, and the votes they will record from next week’s election.
Given the vulnerability of touch screen voting systems, election procedures must be stringent and consistently followed. Safe procedures call for memory cards to be inserted only into computers that are carefully secured and never connected to the Internet. Using ordinary laptop computers, borrowed from offices and homes, to process memory cards is dangerous. The video shows that this practice is not the isolated act of a few election workers, but an official plan put in place by election officials.
“Not only does this video demonstrate how potential security threats can be realized, this is yet another illustration of how election officials are forced to develop their own processes and procedures in order to operate their new election systems,” said Steven Hertzberg, Project Director at Election Science Institute. “Often we find that critical procedures and essential tools were not developed or deployed with this new election system, leaving election officials to fend for themselves. Diebold should have provided an archiving system as part of their delivery to jurisdictions, before this system went live nationally.”
Voting machine vendors and election officials often argue that rigorous procedures can compensate for the technical weaknesses of voting machines. Some jurisdictions implement such procedures well, but many do not. Talking about procedural controls is easy. Putting them into practice is much harder.
“I first raised concerns to the Cuyahoga County Board of Election in mid-Summer, after Secretary of State Blackwell released an advisory about transferring electronic election data to CD ROM. After I witnessed the transfer, I raised concerns a potential security breach to Cuyahoga Board of Elections Chairman Bennett and the rest of the board on October 2nd,” said Adele Eisner. “Unfortunately, the board simply defended its dangerous practice.”
What a farce and a mockery these bastards have made of our elections and DEMOCRACY. Treasonous conduct these fascists have committed,.. as long as they win and hold on to power,.. they could not give a damn.
I love the point about 3/4 through the second video where the videographer tells the election official that the camera isn’t on and that he’s not filming. It’s hilarious that he would believe him. Obviously as BradBlog can second, all journalistic ethics no longer exist. Well done.
Think Lou Dobbs might be interested in this? Send the video!!!
From Digital Trends:
So, Time Warner’s CNN is aiming to expand its citizen journalism initiatives, offering people around the world the opportunity to submit their stories, video, audio, and pictures to CNN for possible distribution via the network’s considerable distribution channels.
First, CNN is accepting submissions from readers and viewers through I-Report: submissions go through the same vetting process CNN employs for all content distributed through its on-air or online venues. Users can send material via email to ireport@cnn.com or via any of the I-Report logos which accompany news stories, blogs, and other items on the CNN site.
I-Report submissions are also considered for CNN Exchange, a new area of CNN’s online offers focussing exclusively on user-submitted content. “User-generated content has the potential to play a pivotal role in journalism whether it’s online or offline,” said Mitch Gelman, senior vice president and executive producer for CNN.com. “With CNN Exchange, we’ve essentially created a one-stop shop for CNN.com users to share their contributions with other Internet users, as well as to weigh in on the day’s most pressing news.”
Unbelievable! Every report on Brad Blog is more unbelievable than the next! Will Lou Dobbs report on this? Why doesn’t Lou Dobbs just HIRE Brad & Bev Harris???
Again…first they said “tin foil hat”…
WHEN IS EVERYONE GOING TO LEARN, THAT WHEN THE FIRST DEFENSE OUT OF SOMEONE’S MOUTH IS “TIN FOIL HAT”…THEN THEY ARE COVERING UP SOMETHING? IT IS THE #1 DEFENSE OF A LIAR!!!!!!!!!
On March 22, 2006 the Chairperson of the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) issued a binding Addendum for ALL NASED Qualified voting systems that used a memory card or other removable medium on which to store election data. This Addendum was the result of the Hursti 1 and II Reports, the California Secretary of State’s technical Report issued on February 14, 2006, and comunications between NASED and computer scientists. After these consultations and reports NASED felt the dangers to America’s voting systems was strong enough that it felt compelled to issue these new requirements. The second page contains the following:
Every memory card requires at least the same level of protection as the ballot boxes and ballots used in the election. To prevent corruption of memory cards NASED hereby adopts an official addendum to the qualification of all voting systems that include a memory card that functions to store and transfer ballot images or tabulation data:
1. Throughout the life of the voting system, the election official shall maintain control of all memory cards and keep a perpetual chain of custody record for all of the memory cards used with the system. Programmed memory cards shall be stored securely at all times with logged accesses and transfers.
2. Immediately after the memory card is installed in the voting station, the card shall be sealed against unauthorized access. The voting station shall not be set into election mode until after the memory card is sealed inside.
3. Use controlled serialized seals that are tamper resistant and resistant to inadvertent breakage along with verifiable seal logs.
4. In post-election mode, print the results report prior to removing the memory card from the optical scanner. If additional reports other than the results report are available, print these as well.
Failure to comply with this addendum negates the voting system’s status as a NASED-qualified voting system.
Sandra J. Steinbach
Chairperson, NASED Voting Systems Board
There has been some confusion because Requirement 4 refers to an optical scanner. Some people have understood this to mean this Addendum applies only to optical scanners. Please look at the opening to these requirements, which in the original Addendum was made bold:
“….NASED hereby adopts an official addendum to the qualification of all voting systems that include a memory card.”
Many states require that a voting sysetm must have received a NASED Qualification number as one of the requirements for approval for use in their state, California is one of those states. If the procedures used by local election officials do not conform with the above requirements then the NASED qualificaiton is VOID (negated).
In California local election officials, especially in San Diego, have violated one or more of the requirements. Sending voting units home with poll workers for days or weeks prior to the election violates Requirement 1. We also know that counties such as San Diego County DID NOT “… If additional reports other than the results report are available, print these as well.” The entire purpose for printing out the available reports from the voting unit is to provide a forensic trail so election officials can prove the voting units worked as they were supposed to, and there was no tampering or other unknown access. Reports available include the Audit log which shows all events that occurred on the machine, including the time and date, a total results tape, and a long form Totals Tape. San Diego failed to print out the other available reports as required.
The certified approval by Bruce McPherson of the Diebold voting systems required as one of the Conditions for Approval that the voting system SHALL have a NASED Qualification. If the Requirements of the NASED Addendum were not followed, then the Qualification WAS VOIDED. If VOIDED, then its Conditional Approval by the Secretary of State was also voided.
There is a more basic issue here. The vendors are supposed to be providing voting systems that are already secure, accurate, fit for their intended use, and free of defects. Instead they are perpetuating a fraud upon the American people and then expecting the taxpayers of this country to pay for the mitigations and repairs to compensate for their defective and insecure products. Many election officials have been complicit in this fraud, both by denying such defects exist until citizen activists expose the defects, and then using taxpayers dollars, and poll workers labor to implement stop-gap and half-hearted fixes. In the meantime the voters of this country justifiably lose even more confidence that our votes are counted accurately, and in the state and local election officials who spend more time and effort protecting the vendors and creating a false perception that all is well.
State election officials such as California’s Secretary of State Bruce McPherson, have a constitutional duty to insure that every voter’s vote is counted and reported as intended. He is the Chief Election official and it is his job to make sure that local election officials comply with the law. Just as Blackwell has failed his duty in Ohio, so has California’s Secretary McPherson.
Adele Eisner of the press release here – (tireless, but tired, and the real work of election integrity 11/7 is only just beginning.
If you want to see the “kicker” – the Cuyahoga Board’s usual “unfortuante” response – their version of security and truth go to:
Sorry about all the misspellings – and lack of link! Rushing here.
To see their version go to
http://adeleeisner.com/securitydiscussion10.2
Yes, as said above, and as BBV always says – we MUST be the media.