By John Gideon and Brad Friedman
“Some people have called those who have long decried our nation’s move toward voting machines nuts or just sore losers,” reads the editorial from yesterday’s Eureka Times-Standard.
“They were loud, and they were strident in proclaiming that they didn’t trust election technologies as much as they trust the ability of actual human beings to count votes,” the paper continues in response to the citizen’s “Transparency Project” in Humboldt County, CA which, as The BRAD BLOG reported last week, discovered some 200 ballots that the county’s Diebold optical-scan system had deleted from the initially certified count. Humboldt registrar Carolyn Crnich — who deserves much credit for working with local election integrity advocates to allow them to create a more transparent, open-source optical-scan system as a check on the buggy Diebold hardware and software — was forced to to re-certify the November 4th election with new results after the findings.
“The recent discovery, thanks to the Humboldt County Election Transparency Project, of a discrepancy in election results due to flawed software reveals that these activists were right to make noise, and right to complain about a company that has been less than responsible in dealing with the problem.”
Thanks for noticing, Times-Standard. Now will the rest of the country notice? Specifically, will the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, responsible for testing and certifying these machines at the federal level, and the U.S. Dept. of Justice, responsible for enforcing federal laws — which again seem to have been violated by Diebold (whose election division now calls themselves Premier) — notice and take action?
Interviews with and responses from CA officials from Crnich to Sec. of State Debra Bowen’s office indicate a serious problem, yet again, with Diebold’s handling of the software failure which the company has known about for four years, even as they allowed election officials to continue using the same system in several states.
The BRAD BLOG has obtained a copy of Diebold’s original terse, emailed notice of the software failure, sent to Crnich’s predecessor in 2004, but never sent to CA’s new Sec. of State, despite her “Top-to-Bottom Review” of all e-voting systems in the state which she undertook after taking office in 2007. (The Diebold email notice is posted below, in full.)
At the same time, local software programmer Mitch Trachtenberg, who developed the simple, transparent, open-source optical-scan software, using off-the-shelf hardware for the citizen’s project — including the ability to post all scanned ballots onto the web for citizen review — may have inadvertently revealed the scam perpetuated by the nation’s electronic voting machine vendor’s who were allocated some $3.9 billion federal tax dollars for their efforts at creating proprietary systems, which don’t even work as promised…or as required by federal law…
Diebold Knew…
Mirroring another recent Diebold/Premier admission that the company knew about their GEMS tabulator software’s inclination to drop thousands of votes without notice to system administrator’s, the company admitted to Crnich last week that the ballots deleted by their optical-scan system was part of a bug they’d known about for at least four years.
During The BRAD BLOG’s regular weekly appearance on the nationally-syndicated Peter B. Collins Show, Crnich was interviewed about the discovery in Humboldt. After initial reports that Diebold had failed to notify the county about the bug in their software, Crnich learned that, in fact, her predecessor had in fact been notified about the problem, via a short email notice, sent by Diebold in October of 2004.
The email from Diebold’s Western Regional Support Manager, sent just more than two weeks prior to the 2004 election included a short attachment explaining the solution, but not the problem. The email follows in full…
To: Billie Alvarez (E-mail); Debbie Hench (E-mail); DeJusto, Madelyn (E-mail); Elaine Ginnold (E-mail); Julie Rodewald (E-mail); McWilliams, Lindsey; Mark Gonzales (E-mail); Ryan Ronco (E-mail); Sally McPherson (E-mail); Sandy Brockman (E-mail); Tulare – Hiley Wallis (E-mail)
Cc: Robert Chen (E-mail)
Subject: Central Count for the upcoming election
I have attached a document that details using Central Count for November – specifically beginning Central Count and the Deck 0. It is very important that you follow these instructions – please contact Rob or myself if you have any questions . Thank you {{Gems1-18-19CentralCount.doc..}}
Tari Runyan
Western Regional Support Manager
Diebold Election Systems
10675 N. Abilene St.
Commerce City, Co 80022
voice [number redacted for privacy] cell [number redacted for privacy] email tarir@dieboldes.com
The WORD file attachment to the email reads in full:
ISSUE:
When running Gems 1.18.19.0 and processing ballots with the Central Count Server an issue exists with correctly sorting committed decks, in some reports, and also deleting other decks under certain conditions, when “deck 0” has not been deleted.
RESOLUTION:
When the election is invoked and there has been no Central Count ballot processing ever done in the database then start the Central Count server and process a “Start” card and then immediately afterwards an “Ender” card. This will commit deck 0 without any ballots and allow the deletion of the committed deck 0 from the database. You should delete Deck 0.
This must be done as the first action after starting Central Count
As Crnich confirmed during our interview with her on the PBC Show, she was never made aware of the problem until after discovering the 200 missing ballots from her previously certified vote totals. She also explained that CA SoS Bowen’s office was unaware of the problem as well.
Deputy Sec. of State and spokesperson Nicole Winger told The BRAD BLOG on Friday that Bowen “is certainly concerned about Premier’s carelessness with yet another elections product and she thinks it’s distressing that the company took virtually no action for years on this apparent defect.”
“Secretary Bowen is talking with the company, county elections officials and others about how to prevent this problem from ever happening again in California,” Winger wrote via email.
The Friday radio interview with Crnich, in which she offers more details on what happened and how the discovery was made, can be download here [MP3], or listened to online below (appx. 20 mins)…
‘Humboldt Transparency Project’ Reveals Diebold, U.S. Federal E-Voting Scam | Hundreds of Lost Ballots, Illegal Voting System, and the Boondoggle Behind Billions of Federal Dollars Spent on Voting Machines That Don't Work All Illustrated by Simple Citizen Oversight, Free Open-Source Voting System in One California County... · · · · · ‘Humboldt Transparency Project’ Reveals Diebold, U.S. Federal E-Voting Scam | Hundreds of Lost Ballots, Illegal Voting System, and the Boondoggle Behind Billions of Federal Dollars Spent on Voting Machines That Don't Work All Illustrated by Simple Citizen Oversight, Free Open-Source Voting System in One California County...0:00 0:00
Diebold Blames the Federal Testing Process..
On Sunday, in addition to their editorial, quoted at the top of this article, the Eureka Times-Standard followed up on their excellent reporting on the Humboldt County Election Transparency Project’s findings. The article included this statement about the failure from, the unfortunately-named, Diebold/Premier spokesman Chris Riggall:
“It’s one of the real obstacles in our business that when we identify an issue, getting that enhancement into the field so that issue can be corrected is a very lengthy, laborious, expensive and time-consuming process,” Riggall said. “When you’re not able to do that, you have to rely more on work-arounds and the guidance of your customers.”
Riggall’s statement is an amazing bit of obfuscation and misdirection. The last federal certification of the GEMS tabulator software v. 1.18.19 was done in Sept. 2004. We have also found that the same problem experienced by Humboldt County is still featured in the later GEMS v. 1.18.22 which was certified for use on central count optical-scan systems at the same time as v. 1.18.19.
Since September of 2004, Diebold has presented 13 different system versions for testing and certification by the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED), which oversaw federal testing and certification of voting systems before the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) was created by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002. NASED was allowed to continue testing and certification for the EAC for several years afterwards, until the new federal body, employing many of the same administrators who ran the system at NASED, created their own testing/certification process. The NASED process was quick and simple for the vendors, which is one reason that the voting systems on the market and used across the nation right now — none have yet been certified by the new EAC process — are so prone to seemingly-unending problems and failures.
At any point in 2004, after September, until today, Diebold/Premier could have, in fact, recalled v. 1.18.19 and v. 1.18.22 and any other versions of the faulty software, to replace them with a GEMS version that did not have the problem. They didn’t. And they also, clearly, did not go out of their way to notify election officials about the serious flaw.
Diebold’s Apparent Violation of Federal Law…
The fact that Diebold/Premier did not take the action to recall the systems, actually puts them into a situation where they may very well have violated federal law. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 Title III Section 301(a)(5) mandates an acceptable error rate for voting systems in use in federal elections. That error rate, not counting any error caused by an action of the voter, cannot exceed 0.00001%.
However, in the case of the Humboldt County vote count, the error rate was 0.31%.
We have asked both the Secretary of State of California and the EAC if they plan to take action by asking the US Attorney Office to investigate this seemingly clear violation of federal law. Neither the CA SoS, nor the EAC has yet replied to our queries on that matter.
The Federal E-Voting Scam Revealed…
Mitch Trachtenberg, the software developer who voluntarily created the open-sourced optical-scan system used by Humboldt, as a parallel check and balance to the federally certified Diebold op-scan system detailed how and why he built the software in a posting on his website yesterday.
“Our votes are too important to be counted by secret software running on black-box vendor machines,” Trachtenberg notes at the end of his article.
Of course, he’s correct, as The BRAD BLOG, VotersUnite.org and other Election Integrity organizations around the country have spent years arguing and documenting in excruciating detail.
While there are still transparency concerns, even with open-source paper ballot optical-scan systems such as the one Trachtenberg seemingly developed, rather easily and inexpensively, he may have inadvertently revealed a far larger scam via the simple project developed with Crnich and other election integrity advocates.
Billions of dollars have been allocated via federal law for the testing, certification and “upgrading” to voting systems which are claimed as “proprietary trade secrets” from a handful of private corporations such as Diebold, ES&S, Sequoia, Hart Intercivic and a few others. Virtually every single one of them has proven to miscount votes, break down during voting, and otherwise stay completely un-transparent to the citizens who they are supposed to be serving. The result has been a multi-billion dollar tax-payer boondoggle, and a voting system no more reliable or oversee-able than the voting systems they were meant to replace.
America’s voting system has grown far worse, and less reliable, since 2000, due to the federal laws and mandates ostensibly written to improve it, even as a handful of electronic voting vendors have grown far richer at tax-payer expense.
With Trachtenberg’s off-the-shelf hardware and open-source software, developed in a short time, and at no cost at all to the tax-payer, he has virtually on his own, revealed the federal e-voting system to be little more than a scam.
If Trachtenberg could develop such a system on his own, with no federal funding whatsoever, no proprietary software and simple, off-the-shelf scanners, such that it seems to have counted votes more accurately than the one developed for years by Diebold, at enormous tax-payer expense, why shouldn’t every voting jurisdiction that insists on op-scan voting systems immediately sue Diebold (and the other companies) for fraud, breach of contract — or anything else they can find in order to recoup the millions spent on these broken systems — and immediately switch to the Trachtenberg system?
We hope Crnich, Bowen, and election officials around the entire country who insist on such systems will give that notion serious thought. Trachtenburg just proved how easily it can be done, even while proving, yet again, as the Times-Standard noted, that those of us who have been yelling and screaming about these matters for years were “right to make noise, and right to complain about [companies] that [have] been less than responsible in dealing with the problem.”









How about a nice little graphic with Diebold caught with their pants down?
That humboldt project – I was a skeptic (maybe I am too skeptical) but wow – niiiiiice!
Great to see some innovation and action in this area and the results being reported!
It should be pointed out, however, that such an approach has its problems (as pointed out more fully in COMMENTS 3 and 12 on the previous Brad Blog post on this subject https://bradblog.com/?p=6722 ):
The “Trachtenburg System” relies on chain of custody for what tally-transparency it does provide, offers no dispute resolution procedure, and posses serious threats to ballot secrecy of polling place voting by facilitating improper influence such as through vote buying and coercion.
— and immediately switch to the Trachtenberg system?
That is exactly what they should do.
Sunshine is the best disinfectant and you ensure the accuracy and integrity of the election, not by using secret code, but by using open source code.
Um, well, I can think of a way….I call it the DUHS System: “Diebold Uninstall Hardware and Software System.” 😀
PDF is the perfect technology for electronic voting.
Scan’s and drops into preformatted forms.
Built in Optical Character Recognition.
Supports “interesting” fields.
Can be locked down and password protected.
Simple database (books/chapters/index)
I’m not a programmer and I could build an election system based on ballot forms to PDF scan and count.
What do these states have in common: CO, CT, FL, GA, IL, IN, MA, MD, NY, OH, PA, TN, UT, VA? They all used Diebold/Premier equipment in 2008 elections and they all reported problems. See:
But Diebold/Premier’s gross negligence and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission’s failures do not stand alone. The Secretaries of State in 14 states and the Supervisors of Elections in every county where the machines were used had 4 years to uncover discrepancies and press Diebold/Premier to get it right.
The “Election Problem Log 2004 to Date” listing the Diebold (and other vendor) errors is on http://www.votersunite.org. The link is
http://www.votersunite.org/elec...roblemtype=ALL
Wow, makes me proud to be a Humboldt resident. A little surprising, though, that I actually knew about neither this open ballot system nor the discovery of the missed ballots (the latter because I don’t read either of those newspapers). I only found out through the link from Crooks and Liars.
I’ve always had a little more faith in California’s scanned paper ballots (they’re very easy to fill out, and DEFINITELY leave a paper trail), though now I’m torn between “well, guess not so much” and “hey, at least the paper trail worked.” Certainly makes me wish such a system existed elsewhere in the country–you kinda wonder if the last few elections would have turned out the same if it did.
A Class Action Suit appears to be in order.The Plaintifs have adequate evidence, the harm is great, as untold millions have been fraudently caused to be spent on assurances of accurate elections, when nothing of the sort was the truth, as it was known by the makers that their equipment had many faults rendering them unable to comply with the Federal Election law stipulation of an accuracy rate failure of no more than 0.00001%.This is blatant fraud.I urge all County Clerks to sign a Class Action Suit against the fraudulent machines, software.
@ Anonymous Comment #2
The “Trachtenburg System” system as described is not the official system. It is a system used in parallel to the official system. As such, your concerns are not important.
If the “Trachtenburg System” were to become the officially used system, then the concerns that you express in the current and previous posts would certainly need to be addressed.
I agree that the voter/ballot secrecy/anonymity is a major problem since the scanned ballot images are placed online.
MN has a law that ballots are ignored if they have distinguishing marks that can be used to identify the voter. Any jurisdiction using a “Trachtenburg System” would need similar legislation (they may have such already).
http://www.times-standard.com/l...rs/ci_11183863
Any defenders?
Letters to the editor
Posted: 12/10/2008 01:15:38 AM PST
First I’d like to congratulate Kevin Collins, Tom Pinto, Mitch Trachtenberg, Parke Bostrom and all the volunteers of the Election Transparency Project.
Their work revealed a discrepancy caused by Humboldt’s electronic voting equipment last month.
Over the last few years I’ve made many different arguments for getting rid of the Diebold (now Premier) equipment used to count votes in Humboldt County. Somehow it wasn’t enough that they “count” in secret, can be easily manipulated without detection, and report results impossible in a legitimate election.
Somehow local decision makers weren’t deterred from doing business with a company that admitted to illegally installing uncertified software here and elsewhere; that was sued in class action suits filed by company shareholders; and whose then — CEO said he was “committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes” to Bush in 2004.
Now we learn that Humboldt has finally experienced what is euphemistically called a “glitch.” In reality it was a bug in Diebold’s central tabulation program, GEMS. This caused the results of November’s election, already certified as accurate by Registrar of Voters Carolyn Crnich, to be proven inaccurate.
Worse still, Diebold knew about the bug at least four years ago and never fixed it. Other counties were made aware of the problem and told how to work around it. Crnich says she never knew, and I believe her.
This raises many questions, most important among them: Who dares defend the continued use of these machines and the county’s relationship with Diebold/Premier?
Dave Berman
Eureka
I wonder if my local news media (Huntsville/Nashville) will cover this story now? I’m sending in the links, but not holding my breath.
We’ve been banging on this drum for so long, sometimes it just seems surreal. Glad there are still ‘6 or 7’ around who give a damn.
Flashback (just for fun):
https://bradblog.com/?p=1338
(BTW, whatever happened to Robert Pastor anyway?)
And while I’m on an undercaffeinated tangent – anybody heard from Clint Curtis recently?
KestrelBrighteyes- longtime, no see. I miss seeing your excellent posts at BB! Being, myself, another one of the old “6 or 7” here @BB, your question about Robert Pastor struck a cord with me. I got to thinking about him and then suddenly recalled from the e-mails I sent him back in 2005 that he was on the faculty at American University in Washington, D.C., where, coincidentally, my daughter started college this Fall. I checked and he is still at AU but is apparently on sabbatical. I’ll have to tell my daughter about him and ask if she’s ever run into or heard about him. It would be a kick if she ever had a class with him and wore her “BradBlog 6 or 7 Squad” teashirt, although she would be unlikely to do so if it might provoke any controversy.
Hope all is well with you!
As flattered as I am to be singled out, I think the “Trachtenberg System” should probably be the “Humboldt approach”. (Hey, I wouldn’t scream if you added “with Trachtenbergs’s software.”)
The project had many key players. Kevin Collins approached our Registrar Carolyn Crnich several years ago to urge development of a system to somehow get images of the ballots so people could do recounts. In addition, Tom Pinto, Parke Bostrom and David Cobb — the former Green Party candidate for President — have been involved in the project from the start.
The Transparency Project is much more than the software: it was a group of concerned citizens working with a willing public official to do public service at no charge. A lot of work has been put in by a lot of people.
To give you some idea, in addition to those mentioned earlier, that scanner was fed by:
Mark Konkler, Jim Lamport, John Koriagan, Bob Olafson, Jamie Orr, Sherry Skillwoman, Claudio Mendonca, Hank Sims, Heather Harman, and probably someone whose name I’m missing right now. For which I apologize.
I’m sure Brad Friedman knows better than just about anyone how many citizens across the nation have been putting in volunteer hours to try to make sure our elections are honest.
What about the Franken/Coleman race, 22 votes apart out of 3 million + votes? That’s a senatorial election that something like this could swing to the wrong candidate!