Written Testimony provided for the House Committee on Elections for the Texas House of Representatives, 6/23/08, by William Singer, former Election Programmer for Tarrant County, and former technician for Hart Intercivic, a Texas e-voting vendor.

Opening Statement

  I want to express my appreciation to the House Committee for expressing an interest in comments regarding the future of electronic voting in Texas.  I have a relatively unique perspective and I hope my comments, while they may be difficult to hear, may assist in your discussions and decisions on these issues.  My name is William Singer.  In ~2002-2004 I worked for Hart Intercivic as a technician (computing support) in their e-voting division, and subsequently worked, very briefly, as the Election Programmer for Tarrant County, Texas.  At Hart Intercivic I provided remote and onsite technical support, installation services, emergency troubleshooting, and assistance with ballot programming for Hart's customers across multiple states.  This service included all of Hart's eSlate hardware and software products.  
  Unfortunately my comments today do not come as a standard bearer for the status quo or in support of the routine concealment of election problems, but rather a more balanced perspective.  It is also unfortunate that this is the first time that anyone in any federal or state agency has asked for my opinion, despite my unique perspective, and in that we have a telling fact that should be addressed before my more specific comments.  Given the Committee's focus on elections in Texas my name should already be known to you.  Several months after resigning from Hart Intercivic and Tarrant County I provided letters of complaint to the Office's of the Secretary of State in Texas and Ohio.  These complaints detailed issues of fraud, dishonesty, and incompetence by both Hart Intercivic and Tarrant County.  These were, and are, serious issues that deserved investigation.  You did not investigate.  Neither did the Secretaries of State, nor the Attorney General, nor any other official body charged with such responsibilities (anywhere).  Eventually I was forced, despite lacking resources, to file a lawsuit against Hart Intercivic in an effort to raise some of the additional incidents of fraud, deception, and incompetence of Hart Intercivic, and make an effort to recover taxpayer funds we have been cheated out of.  This federal lawsuit, which contains within it ample evidence of Hart's wrongdoing, has also been ignored by Texas officials, including all of those officials at the county level.  Even these hundreds of different county officials could not be bothered to investigate, to ask a single question, nor leverage my expertise in considering their own purchases or use of electronic voting machines.

  In the event you are interested in my original complaints, filed in late 2004, they and the lawsuit details are available here: http://www.bradblog.com/?p=5852 .  This particular article also demonstrates Hart Intercivic malicious dishonesty in trying to cover up their criminal and deceptive practices by attacking me.

  I cite the total lack of interest, of any kind, by any officials across the entire nation, not because I assume my own opinions have any necessary value, but rather because my experiences in this field dictates that any competent election official should at least have followed up to determine my credibility if not also asking for any assistance I might offer.  And if my very serious complaints were ignored then I think it is reasonable to ask how many other complaints were ignored.  How many other people with unusual and genuine expertise were, or are, being ignored?  It does not seem credible that every single election official is simply incompetent and unable to perform a brief internet search on election problems.  The very idea seems absurd, and yet we have the curious fact that officials, including this Committee, have ignored valuable information in a very determined way for many years.
  I would suggest one possible reason, and I mention it because it bears on this very work by the Committee.  It may well be that officials simply are not motivated to fix anything they outright refuse to see as a problem.  A "broken" system may well benefit politicians who cannot see any reason to be proactive in electronic election laws, to be reactive when problems appear, or make any genuine effort to work for the interests of the public and against the interests of a Democratic and Republican Duocracy.  I do not know what the truth of the matter is, but I do know that it is an obscene conflict of interest for you, as elected officials, to be overseeing or "investigating" election issues of any kind.  The sad fact that you would support and participate in such a system speaks to your inability or unwillingness to see beyond your political interests.

  In my original complaints the primary problem I emphasized was a rather comprehensive one: the complete lack of effective oversight for electronic voting and elections.  With respect to providing such oversight I have no reason to believe that any elected official is capable or willing to do so.  However in the interest of making the best of an absurd situation I have provided comments on some specific concerns below, though I want to note two important things:  

1) The information from my original complaints or my federal lawsuit against Hart Intercivic touches on the issues noted below but I partially reiterate some of the more compelling and problematic concerns here.  The whole of my 2004 complaints and lawsuit are still entirely valid and I stand by them.  I raise one additional issue specific to Hart Intercivic at closing.

2) Any honest attempt to fix election problems and create effective oversight REQUIRES the appointment of single long-term membership to an oversight committee whose members have no political backgrounds nor ability to pursue one (signing a declaration that they will not may suffice and may be the only legal option).  An impartial election oversight committee is ultimately the only reasonable solution, and one that I am sure you will not pursue.  Anyone in a political party or elected office and familiar with even the concept of "conflict of interest" would recuse themselves from an election oversight position, and given election officials past lack of effort to even pretend to fulfill their duties, you will understand if I treat your current work with some skepticism and good-humored despair.

The Other Issues

  I've been following the discussions on election issues for some time and it has become clear that many very real problems are not being considered at all.  Electronic voting issues are not as simple as we would like and it is important to fully understand those issues so we can make good decisions and reliably positive changes.  Some of the less obvious technical issues are not really hard to understand, or at least I hope I can demonstrate that to you.  I've selected a handful of concerns from my own experience and I've described them, briefly, below.  Before going into each specific issue however, I'd like to talk to you about something a little more generic.  In the news we often hear a certain phrase from election officials and companies; I expect you have heard it before, it goes something like: "We have no reports of problems."

  When officials say there are no reports of problems, should you just accept that at face value?  Well, by way of example, I reported problems myself, and not one single election official anywhere in the nation contacted me to ask a single question.  And the Secretary of State's office in Texas claimed to have lost the complaint, a mailed and emailed copy, and after emailing yet another, just like Ohio, Texas refused to even respond to me.
  So are there no reports of problems?  Or are reports of problems being ignored?  Does it seem likely that in any large or complex project, like an election, there would be "no reports of problems?"  It seems so unlikely to me as to be absurd, and even insulting for an official to make such a claim.  But then, having worked in elections, having worked with counties and the corporations involved, I have a different perspective.  
  At Hart Intercivic we used to joke about the myth of the perfect election: the election that runs smoothly, without problems.  While I was there it never happened.  Not once.  Not in any election Hart employees knew about.

  I am not asking that you simply believe me and my personal experience in elections.  Take an example from your own life - how many large projects in your life have gone smoothly?  Does it seem realistic to you that when election officials or vendors claim there are no problems that it could possibly be true?  If you can believe that, then you probably aren't following election issues at all, and you won't be concerned about the issues raised in my current lawsuit or complaints of 2004.  But if you are concerned and don't quite understand what all of those details might "add up to," I'll try to explain a few of the more serious technical issues that I've raised.

  In describing these issues, taken partly from the allegations in the complaint, I want to very clear about three things.  First, with respect to these allegations, I have not yet been to court and proven these things regarding Hart Intercivic, and may never have a chance to do so.  Second, I am not here describing these particular problems with respect to Hart, but trying to explain why the issues themselves are important.  These issues can potentially come up with any election company, and I have reasons to believe that they do.  Third, the problems I list below are not identical to the allegations made in the complaint, but more general descriptions of IT (information technology) problems that concerned citizens should be aware of.  They are only meant to be related to the complaint in a conceptual way and my comments (before closing) are not intended to relate specifically to any one company or situation, even where I seem to be citing specific examples. 

A. Problem: Failure to fully and properly test all of the equipment and software used in elections

  Many people have been led to believe that "state certification" and "federal certification" means that voting equipment (including software) is thoroughly tested by multiple groups of people prior to being used in elections.  That is completely untrue.  The "certifications" are actually not about testing the equipment at all.  It is a relatively simple review to make sure that certain standards are met, and problems slip through with more frequency than you might imagine.  And if you want to know what those standards are, so would everyone else.  They can, in fact, vary from state to state, from year to year, and from company to company.  
  But, you think, surely the county officials test the equipment before an election.  Actually at least one test is generally required, however in my experience that test isn't always a thorough one even with respect to basic functionality, and the observers are usually wholly incompetent even when they are actually paying attention.   
  And have the voting machines companies tested their equipment, or done so adequately?
  Let me put it this way - how would you know?

B. Problem: No bug reports given to customers

  If you have any experience with computer software or hardware you know that companies making such products often release patches (fixes) for problems, and they normally release a detailed report of what was actually fixed (called "bug" reports).  While companies don't always release these reports to the public, they certainly do release them to major customers so those customers can decide whether to use the (hopefully) improved versions of the software or hardware.
  One of the allegations in my federal lawsuit is that Hart Intercivic did not provide bug reports to its customers (meaning county officials, not the actual taxpayers).  People may not understand the implications of this kind of behavior by voting machine companies.  One thing it means is that the companies know certain problems exist right now, but they do not intend to reveal the nature of the fixes coming with a patch or new version, and that they are not telling customers that known problems currently DO exist with the products they actually have.  In other words, not only are companies hiding the current problems, but they aren't going to tell you whether problems were fixed, why you should use the updated software, or whether any known problems were not fixed and will still exist.
  If election companies know problems exist in their software and hardware, and they conceal some or all of that information, does that possibility concern you?

C. Problem: Secret vote recovery methods

  Machines break.  Sometimes computers break in a way that won't let you normally access the information you had on it.  But people who design electronic devices for a living have cleverly built in ways to recover information from a "crash."  If your computer fails, for example, you can send it off to a company that provides recovery services and for a fee they will try to save your information and send it back to you.  
  They cannot guarantee this work, nor will they reveal the secret methods they use.  When voting machines companies do this, which may include sending your voting machine out of state or out of the country to have it repaired or votes recovered, does that possibility concern you?  Other states or nations may not even have the same laws regarding the handling of your vote, and companies are keeping all of this information confidential, citing the need to protect their trade secrets.  
  Should trade secrets, of any kind, really trump concerns about how votes are handled?  Or how and where voting machines are being handled?

D. Problem: Simulated voting

  To be brief I will actually cite part of my federal lawsuit here:
"
At page 4-103 Hart states that it has "developed a vote simulation utility, used to simulate voting on the eSlate System, and will provide this capability for Boulder County.”
"
  Voting machine companies would like the ability to test voting in large numbers, so they can (in theory) test their products.  It indicates that a software program has ALREADY been created that will manipulate the equipment to produce large numbers of votes.  Now you might assume that the voting machine companies would try to carefully guard these programs so they cannot be adapted by anyone or used inappropriately.  But where counties are requiring such software on their own to do testing, should you be confident that "some" number of counties possessing this software will all be responsible with it?  And if special utilities of all types are being handled by large numbers of people, can voting machine companies really say with confidence that their equipment is secure?
  Should your county officials be allowed to request this kind of software from the voting machine companies, when we know that each such exposure increases the chance of such software being used to damage an election?  I am not referring to the more technically difficult task of actually invisibly manipulating an election for a specific result, but simply using such software on accident and damaging an election would be terribly expensive if the election must be rerun.  Elections take a lot more of our money than we realize, and running them twice isn't likely to lower our taxes.  Remember also that while "hacking" is a flashy term for one kind of electronic election problem, simply deleting or corrupting an election can be far more devastating.

Closing Comments

  I would like this Committee to explain to the public why a voting machine company, in Hart Intercivic, is allowed to do business in Texas despite proof that they are dishonest.  They have lied about every issue in the lawsuit (such as the audit report issue, which is easily proven from official election backups) and lied about me directly on several occasions and in several ways, first claiming I was fired, then "disgruntled", then that I was a "tin-hat" and somehow in league with people who may simply fear electronic voting (though Hart employees know perfectly well that I have always supported electronic voting (just not run or supported by people who are dishonest.))  It is not difficult to demonstrate that Hart Intercivic is dishonest, but I am loss to understand why the state seeks to do business with a dishonest election vendor, of all things.

  I would also like the Committee to explain why they have ignored serious complaints about electronic voting vendors, how many other complaints they have ignored, and why the Secretary of State and Attorney General have also been allowed to demonstrate a total lack of interest in protecting Texas taxpayers from fraud.
  
  Finally, I would like the Committee to explain why they have no respect for the United States Constitution, the Texas Constitution, or the very concept of our electoral processes, given that they have not stopped the use of Hart Intercivic machines.  I refer to Hart Intercivic here specifically, and not electronic election companies in general, because I am not referring to any of the prior issues I mentioned.  I am now referring to the fact that Hart's equipment and software cannot be legally used in any election anywhere in the United States, nor has any election run on Hart's equipment been valid.  To wit, Hart's claim of "triplicate original's" in their e-voting solution is wholly illegal and a moronic marketing ploy.  It is designed to take advantage of election official's total lack of technical (IT) knowledge (and expecting that election officials would not bother to obtain such knowledge and apply it intelligently to elections) or even a vague concern about legally running elections.  The "triplicate original" claim by Hart makes their eSlate election "solution" illegal everywhere.  It means that they cannot provide "backups" for a vote, they cannot provide a single vote per person as it required by law everywhere (and cannot be overridden by the Secretary of State or anyone else), and that you cannot perform a recount on a system that does not allow you to count the votes in the first place.  No voter can have multiple votes.  On Hart's system the three votes, according to Hart, are originals, and that means you cannot distinguish between any of them, nor can you count them, and if they were different in any way you could not even pick between them.  If a vote was missing then you could not legally count either of the two remaining "original" votes.  You cannot count votes on a Hart machine any more than you could count 3 paper votes submitted by a single person, whether such votes all agreed or not.  The three votes would be destroyed by law, and the voter may even be arrested for election fraud.

  So I, and those members of the public who have given you their trust, would appreciate knowing why you, and every other Texas official, have wholly neglected your real (apolitical) responsibilities with respect to the conduct of elections, and how long you intend to continue doing so.

Sincerely,
William Singer

email: elrepcom@yahoo.com