Blogged by Brad Friedman on 5/15/2006 8:31AM  
Media Then Reported Diebold's Downplaying of Threat as State's Own Assessment
(Why not just do away with the middle man and let Diebold run everything?)

"It is like the nuclear bomb for e-voting systems," said Avi Rubin, computer science professor at Johns Hopkins University. "It's the deal breaker. It really makes the security flaws that we found (in prior years) look trivial."
-- From Security Focus, 5/12/06

Pennsylvania officials warned local election registrars last week about the vulnerability in the mechanism that installs and upgrades software on Diebold equipment. It said the risk of the vulnerability being exploited was "low".
-- From AP, 5/11/06

The first graf above, quoting Rubin, comes from a superb and indepth article by Robert Lemos at Security Focus on the latest Diebold security disaster. We recommend his report for a host of reasons, amongst them; his broad coverage of dozens of the stories we've yelled and screamed about here at The BRAD BLOG over the past several months, but also because he adds loads of details to the latest Diebold mess which is finally being picked up by the mainstream media. Big time. (Here's an eye-popping compilation of scores of articles from just last Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, with many more to come.)

We point to Rubin's quote --- similar to on the record statements from of the other computer scientists and e-voting security professionals familiar with the details of the built-in "feature" in Diebold's touch-screen systems now revealed to be an extraordinary security vulnerability --- by way of contrast to the way both Diebold and the State of Pennsylvania (and subsequently the bulk of the media) reported their characterization of the problem. That would be the second graf of this story in which AP quotes PA officials describing the risk as "low."

From Diebold's Mouth to Your Ears...

We're often asked, by media folks and others, why it is that Election Officials seem to stand by their E-Voting Machines and Vendors, such as Diebold, ES&S and others, instead of holding them accountable and independently verifying their (usually unsupported) claims about the security and reliability of their voting machines --- as Leon County, FL Supervisor of Elections, Ion Sancho and Emery County, UT County Clerk, Bruce Funk, both rare exceptions --- did.

Setting aside that both Sancho and Funk have been fighting with state officials to hang on to their jobs ever since, The BRAD BLOG has obtained a few documents which underscore what's really at work in the bulk of Election Official/Election Machine Vendor relationships...

While we're unable to give a definitive answer to those who ask why so many of these Election Officials seem to stand by their vendors, we might suggest it most likely has to do with a) Most of these officials have been wined, dined and wooed by the Voting Machine company reps, and in the process told that anybody who suggests these machines are enormously flawed are little more than kooks, luddites and/or conspiracy theorists (see this story from one of our Diebold insiders, "DIEB-THROAT", on how that works inside the company culture) and b) After Elections Officials pitch these million dollar contracts to their state and county superiors, putting their own reputations on the line in favor of these companies and their systems, it'll be their own asses in a sling if they now admit they were wrong to have done so, and have wasted millions of state and county dollars in the bargain.

There is also the idea that c) Many of these officials hope to get higher paying jobs with the vendors themselves when they leave office. But we'll leave that notion largely aside for now since it's generally speculative (albeit, based on a fair bit of circumstantial evidence to bear it out.)

Once the Election Officials have signed their deal with the devil, however, they've got so much money and reputation invested, and so little ability (time, resources, technical know-how) to actually double-check anything they are told by the company --- technical or otherwise --- that they become little more than company mouthpieces, crossing their fingers, and hoping the company line ends up being the truth come Election Day.

For a practical, easy-to-understand, visual example of how that works, see the two short documents posted in full below.

The first is Diebold's "Notification of Potential Security Threat to AccuVote-TS/TSx Machines" as sent to the Secretary of the Commonwealth in Pennsylvania on May 1, concerning the hugely absurd, newly revealed flaw/"feature"/security risk built in to all Diebold touch-screen voting machines.

The second, is the PA Secretary's "DIRECTIVE CONCERNING THE INSTALLATION OF FILES REGARDING THE DIEBOLD ACCUVOTE-TSX ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH," issued to county Elections Officials the following day on May 2.

Titles Change, But the Words Remain the Same...

Both documents are, word for word, virtually identically (and "virtually" is rather an understatement). No checks, no balances, no questions, no independent verification of any of Diebold's claims about the problems or the solutions for it. Just a repetition of what Diebold told them, verbatim.

Note the phrase, identical in both the Diebold "notification" and the PA "directive": "The probability for exploiting this vulnerability to install un-authorized software that could affect an election is considered low."

That very phrase, also verbatim, then made it's way into innumerable media stories (see the AP reporte quoted at the top of this piece) which covered this immensely dangerous security chasm, and reported "risk considered low" as the official point of view of "officials in Pennsylvania".

Perhaps Pennsylvania and the other states could save some money and just do away with any pretense of actually testing anything --- since they failed to find this problem (undoubtedly failed to even look for it!) --- or in notifying county elections officials about these problems, and instead just let Diebold take care of everything for them.

Why not? All they seem to do is retype and repeat what Diebold tells them anyway. Taken at face value, and dutifully passed on to the counties...and then to the media.

Have any doubts? See the May 1 "notification" from Diebold and the May 2 "directive" from Pennsylvania's Secretary of the Commonwealth which follow in their near-identical entirety. Other than the change of format, the two documents are virtually identical...word-for-word...

Notification of Potential Security Threat to
AccuVote-TS/TSx Machines

May 1, 2006

Overview:

Diebold Election Systems, Inc. ("DESI") has determined there is a security vulnerability to the AccuVote-TS and AccuVote-TSx equipment in the system installation and upgrade mechanism. This security vulnerability could potentially allow un-authorized software to be loaded onto the system. The probability for exploiting this vulnerability to install un-authorized software that could affect an election is considered low.

To exploit this risk, physical access is required to the PCMCIA slots on the machine during system startup.

Diebold Election Systems is currently working on a fix to this security vulnerability and once it is tested and certified it will be made available to customers.

Procedures to mitigate the risk:

If there is a concern that this security vulnerability has been, or could be, used to load un-authorized software on the system then re-install the authorized software during system startup prior to installing, testing, and sealing the election data PCMCIA card into the unit.

DIRECTIVE CONCERNING THE INSTALLATION OF FILES REGARDING THE DIEBOLD ACCUVOTE-TSX ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH

Pursuant to Section 1105-A of the Pennsylvania Election Code, at 25 P. S. �3031.5, and revised as required by Act 150 of 2002, the following Directive is issued by the Secretary of the Commonwealth for the installation of files for the Diebold AccuVote-TSX electronic voting system.

1. Diebold Election Systems, Inc. ("DESI") has determined there is a potential security vulnerability in the system installation and upgrade mechanism to the AccuVote-TSX version 4.6.4 equipment, which is currently certified in Pennsylvania. This security vulnerability could allow un-authorized software to be loaded on to the system. The probability for exploiting this vulnerability to install un-authorized software that could affect an election is considered low. To exploit this risk, physical access is required to the Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) slots on the machine during system startup.

2. Diebold Election Systems shall develop a permanent solution to this security vulnerability, which shall proceed through the ordinary certification process. Once the permanent solution is certified, Diebold shall make that solution available to its customers through the normal software upgrade process.

3. In order to mitigate any immediate risk, all counties using the Diebold AccuVote-TSX shall re-install the authorized software during system startup prior to installing, testing, and sealing the election data PCMCIA card into the unit. The Department of State will furnish the authorized software to the counties on a PCMCIA card along with instructions for its installation.

Buzz this story! C2NN: Submit it!


READER COMMENTS ON
"IDENTICAL DOCS: PA State 'Directive' on New Diebold Security Hole a Word-for-Word Parrot of Diebold's Own 'Notification' Sent to State!"
(10 Responses so far...)

COMMENT #1 [Permalink]
... big dan said on 5/15/2006 @ 9:45 am PT...


By stating that the risk of exploiting an admitted security hole is "low"...is admitting that there is a security hole!!! Does anyone get that??? Am I going insane, or is everyone stupid!!!

It also implies, "There is a security hole, and it can be exploited." DUH F***ING DUH!!!

Where's the election officials that are supposed to be doing something, now that they have admitted themselves, that there is a security hole???


COMMENT #2 [Permalink]
... Dredd said on 5/15/2006 @ 10:20 am PT...


... more like a chasm than a hole ...


COMMENT #3 [Permalink]
... czaragorn said on 5/15/2006 @ 11:04 am PT...


Keep on slugging, Brad! You da man! What, do they think we're ALL stupid???


COMMENT #4 [Permalink]
... V. Kurt Bellman said on 5/15/2006 @ 11:07 am PT...


Dan, DREDD:

You're of course correct. But I'm at a loss for what Pennsylvania's short term option was. From the general reading I'm doing, it seems Diebold will have to close this chasm or be decertified for November.

Pennsylvania didn't REALLY REALLY have the option of going to paper ballots hand counted because the United States Department of Justice had already announced they were going to sue Pennsylvania if they did that after the Westmoreland County case was decided by the Commonwealth Court.

That court said, "go use paper ballots for federal offices and keep your old machines for state offices." USDOJ intervened and threatened a federal lawsuit if PA did that.

Paper ballots hand counted has a lot of appeal, but not to a lot of really mean lawyers who like to sue people.


COMMENT #5 [Permalink]
... dkd said on 5/15/2006 @ 11:31 am PT...


Brad and all - clicked on the Leon Co. Fl. link provided by John Gideon yesterday in his Daily Voting News and was a little concerned (and surprised) by what was reported as Sancho's feeling towards Diebold now. Towards the very end of the article, its reported "Sancho said he feels better about Diebold machines now because the California team thoroughly evaluated them." Don't know what exactly to make of that statement. Has he succumbed to the pressure of deadlines? Evidently he's confident that he can now conduct a fair election in Leon Co. with the knowledge he's gained from his and California's testing. Wonder what he thinks about the chances of a fair election with diebold equipment in other Fl. Co's. and in other states?


COMMENT #6 [Permalink]
... big dan said on 5/15/2006 @ 12:43 pm PT...


When there were paper ballots, there could be no loophole. A broken pencil? Mass changes of votes by one person with access? Couldn't happen. Whatever powers that be, rammed these machines down our throats, these "loopholes" were no accident! Why would we switch from a much cheaper, less hackable system...to a more expensive, more easily hackable system...and hackable by less people??? It was no accident.


COMMENT #7 [Permalink]
... big dan said on 5/15/2006 @ 12:44 pm PT...


By "hackable by less people", I mean less people can change more votes, and detected less.


COMMENT #8 [Permalink]
... Ram said on 5/15/2006 @ 1:23 pm PT...


Pennsylvania has many esteemed universities and lots of state colleges. Yet, it appears that the state has no one who can formulate a coherent thought. Do all of the grads move to other states? (We know they aren't moving to Ohio --- doesn't seem to be much of an intellect among the population there either.)

So where are they? Does it become unbearable for "thinking" people to live amidst such sheer stupidity?

I don't have a degree; yet, I can't take the simple-mindedness that pervades the masses in today's PA --- I moved away. (And I find the same simple mindedness in the citizens of Arizona--there is no escape afterall.)

Not so long ago, it wasn't that way. Those were the days --- before Rush, before Newt, before Rove. The anti-war movement produced a generation of "enlightened" people. They used their heritage of "Fighting Against the Man" to participate in stopping that other illegal war.

Maybe when the masses of PA don't have enough work to pay for the gas that goes into their SUV's and hummers and giant pickups-- maybe then they will rise up once again --and insist that their vote be counted!!


COMMENT #9 [Permalink]
... Jody Holder said on 5/15/2006 @ 11:53 pm PT...


Thanks Brad for illustrating so well the willing collaboration between election officials who are supposed to guard the the citizenry from defective or fraud prone voting systems, and the manufacturers whose primary goal is to generate income with the least amount of cost.

Local election officials put their trust into the state to only approve voting systems that comply with the law, are a wise expenditure of taxpayer funds, will provide the voters of the state with election results they can trust are accurate, and act as a check upon the claims of the vendors. What we have seen instead are state officials parroting vendors instead of challenging the vendor's claims. That is a betrayal of local officials and their trust in the state, and the citizens of that state.

Re Comment #5: The report of what Ion's attitude is regarding Diebold is not a quote, nor states when he supposedly expressed that sentiment. If he made it shortly after the California examination was issued it would reflect the knowledge available at that time. As a reporter's paraphrase, it should be checked with Ion himself.

I have my doubts regarding that paraphrase. Ion Sancho has a legal background. He also is familiar with the California
report. He knows that the California team did not thoroughly evaluate the Diebold voting systems. They were provided by Diebold with particular source codes related to the memory card and firmware for four weeks. They were not given any working machines, nor memory cards that had been loaded with ballot definitions and election criteria by the central election management program (GEMS). Without any working machines in front of them they could not know what all the various methods there might be to access the memory cards other than by physical possession. As was discovered in Utah's much more in-depth evaluation, there are multiple methods by which an election can be compromised.

The California team was limited in their access to the entire voting system, and in their mandate from the California Secretary of State. While the team assembled by Black Box Voting examined the actual TSx touch screen voting system in Utah. With just one day to examine the voting system they found the most serious risks ever discovered in electronic voting systems. Imagine what could be found if a team was allowed to forensically de-construct all of Diebold Election Systems' products. Better, that the same team be able to thoroughly examine all electronic based voting systems.

I will point out that the one opportunity given for an independent evaluation by Compuware of other voting systems found serious deficiencies.

The contrast of the statement that the vulnerabilities are "low risk" with the reaction of Michael Shamos is stark.
"There are two types of security holes," he said. "The ones that are designed in and which you didn't think about the security implications beforehand or a bug--a mistake--in the program code. This is the first kind: It is not a bug; it's a horribly designed feature." Michael Shamos, professor of computer science at Carnegie Mellon University and adviser to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on electronic voting."

All election officials need to start representing the interests of the voters, not the vendors.


COMMENT #10 [Permalink]
... Dredd said on 5/16/2006 @ 7:30 am PT...


Election officials perform like the Iraqi press:

"To be fair, the local media would not be thriving as they are today without the help of the military, which has gone out of its way to provide Iraqi journalists with access, training in the basics of reporting, equipment, and funding to operate newspapers and TV and radio stations. 'But there’s always a catch,' the Marine public affairs officer told me. 'You don’t get something for free.' Referring to an IO-funded newspaper that operated briefly in Fallujah, the officer said, 'The compromise here was we’ll fund your newspaper, mister Iraqi editor, but you may have to run coalition information'” (link here, emphasis added).

Yep, Mr. Election Official, we will provide you with news releases, and you provide us with all that HAVA money, and "democracy" will prevail.

Yeah right ... I know a republican dictatorship when I see one ... and smell one ... whew! that gives new meaning to rank!


-=- Comments on this item are now closed. -=-


VotersUnite.org's Daily Voting News 'Daily Voting News'
For December 04, 2008

by John Gideon

The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) was signed into law in Oct. 2002. Amongst other things HAVA required the formation of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and provided some mandates, in Title III of the law, for federal elections including some standards for voting systems. Those standards include, but are not limited to, accessibility for voters with disabilities and accuracy in the vote count. Testing by experts in accessibility has shown that none of the Direct Recording Electronic (DRE, usually touch-screen) voting systems presently in use meet the requirements for accessibility for disabled voters. Failures in testing and vote counting in real elections have also proven that, at times, the voting systems presently being used across the country do not meet the federally mandated requirements for accuracy.

So what guidance has been provided by the EAC to the states with regards to Title III? Well, actually none. In fact even though voting systems presently in use do not meet federal law the EAC is just now getting around to issuing guidance to state and local election officials and, according to the draft of the plan ‘featured’ below, it is going to take another two years before the EAC can complete the guidance.

Why can’t they just tell the vendors and the states that the law is clear and, if they fail to follow that law, violations will be referred to the DoJ? The fact that the vendors misrepresent their products as being accessible is a clear violation of the law. It is time they are held responsible and it doesn’t take two years of studying Title III of HAVA to make that clear....

Click for links to all of today's notable voting news headlines...

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