


BROKEN LINKS

The Riverside County, CA Election Process

Secure Elections Require a Continuous and
Secure Chain-of- Custody



When ANY link breaks, the election results are also
broken- this report found 1,000s of “broken links”



Broken links and what to do for November 2008
A comprehensive review by SAVE R VOTE of
Security and of Chain-of-Custody Issues in Our
Recent Elections

www.savervote.com

9-16-08

Executive Summary

SAVE R VOTE is a non-partisan citizen-driven organization dedicated to the goal of secure, auditable and transparent elections in Riverside County. Over the last 4 years, 100+ volunteers have put in over 5,000 hours monitoring, analyzing, reporting, and recommending actions for improvement of the electoral system. As a result of SAVE R VOTE recommendations, over two dozen improvements have been implemented.

And while these improvements slowly move the county forward in compliance with election laws, certification requirements, and transparency, the fact remains that Riverside County is still out of compliance with a good number of laws and regulations. The laws and regulations are absolute – they don't provide for partial compliance. We applaud the steps made toward compliance, but now is the time to comply without exception.

The biggest problems we observed were:

- Inadequate security for the ballots, voting machines and memory cards, often in apparent violation of election code, certification requirements and ROV policy;
- A lack of accountability all along the chain of custody of these essential election materials is again often in apparent violation of election law, certification requirements and ROV policy;

In America, our vote is the currency of our democracy. As Thomas Paine said, “The right of voting ...is the primary right by which all other rights are protected. To take away this right is to reduce man to slavery.” Nationwide there has been a multitude of reports of problems with accurately counting votes on electronic voting machines and scanners/tabulators that are easily programmed to produce any result desired. In one precinct in Ohio [Gahanna, OH Ward 1B – New Life Church Polling site], 4,258 electronic votes were recorded when there were only 638 registered voters <http://forums.randi.org/archive/index.php/t-30663.html>.

When there is insufficient transparency to allow the citizens to see exactly how *every* aspect of the election is conducted (as required by California Election Code Sections 15004 et al), then there is no ability to verify that the announced results reflect the wishes of the voters.

Think about this concept for just a moment. History tells us of political operatives who will do anything to win an election. After all, the very fate of the world is potentially at stake when Americans go to the polls in November to vote for a president and a vice president. These two individuals will have control over trillions of dollars of assets (and debt) and will control the mightiest military on

the planet. In local elections, budgets totaling in the billions and critical policy issues are at stake.

No criminal background checks are performed in Riverside County, despite repeated requests and warnings of the consequences. No outside audits of the ROV operations have been performed, as recommended by the Blue Ribbon Committee and SAVE R VOTE. Therefore the citizens have the right, indeed the duty, to monitor elections to minimize any appearance of or actual impropriety.

What follows are findings of “broken links” in the security and the “chain-of-custody” of our election system here in Riverside County. If the citizens fail to insist on closing the broken links, and the Board and the Registrar refuse to mend them, we will be absolutely unable to verify the most important activity of our government, the orderly transition of power through an honest and transparent balloting process.

The top 10 “broken links” in Riverside County

1. ***Voting machines are left unattended*** in public locations for up to 11 days before the election, making them vulnerable to tampering or theft.
2. ***Many voting machines are never signed for or dated*** upon leaving the ROV warehouse, thus leaving no accountability for who has them or who has access to them and for how long.
3. Failure of many precinct workers to complete accurately the required reconciliation documents of the number of cast and unused ballots potentially compromises the integrity of the vote count process by leaving the status of ***tens of thousands of ballots un-reconciled***. Unused ballots have been used to increase vote counts in other jurisdictions.
4. ***Over 98% of precinct inspectors failed to count the number of blank ballots*** they were given before the election as they are required by ROV accountability procedures. Of the few who did, we found several who reported receiving fewer than the number printed on the Ballot Inventory Sheet. Only 9 of 720 inspectors (just over 1%) properly completed the beginning Ballot Inventory Sheet.
5. ***A number of the boxes of voted and unvoted ballots***, required by regulations to be sealed to prevent tampering, **arrived at the collection centers without any seals** or with broken seals and no explanation or follow up as to why security is so lax.
6. ***Some of the 22 collection sites***, where precinct inspectors bring their ballots and voting machine memory cards after the polls close, **have consistently failed to account for the items brought to them** from the precincts, with the ROV’s office being the prime example.
7. The ***privacy of vote-by-mail ballots has been completely compromised since a November 2007 decision by the ROV to eliminate privacy sleeves*** for the ballots. Without the privacy sleeves, ROV staff can now see how

- someone voted the minute they remove the ballot from the envelope (which contains the voter's name), thus compromising every voters' right to cast his or her ballot anonymously and privately. Unscrupulous staff could "lose" ballots for the "wrong" candidate.
8. On Election Night, *workers at the central office often failed to record what came in and the time, making accountability for ballots and memory cards virtually impossible.* In addition, observers were prohibited from viewing any items coming in the back of the building, thus raising further opportunities for undetected election fraud.
 9. *The ROV indicated an intention to erase the results cartridges of June election, thus preventing the "original" electronic votes from ever being audited.*
 10. *No copy of required Precinct results posting indicating number of ballots cast is sent to the ROV office as required by "Certification Condition 15", thus giving no comparison number to check central tabulator numbers against.*

Following the discussion of the above 10 key "broken links" is a listing and discussion of nine other significant findings that warrant immediate attention by Riverside County. Some of these requirements are conditions of the state certification of the Sequoia Election System; strict compliance with them is essential to maintaining that certification.

This report will focus primarily on the weaknesses in the chain-of-custody, a process critical to ensuring that ballots are not lost, added, or altered. As Secretary of State Debra Bowen said [about the chain of custody process with electronic voting machines], "In Nevada, they do a better job of testing and monitoring electronic slot machines than anybody anywhere in this country that has evaluated electronic voting machines. And all you're talking about with electronic slot machines is money – you're not talking about democracy, freedom, human rights and all of the decisions that come about as a result of elections."

The current system encourages precinct workers, who frequently don't account for the number of cast and unused ballots, to "leave it to the main office to fix" in the days after the election as observers heard trainers say. We have observed hundreds of documents modified/"corrected" by ROV headquarters staff; many of these modified documents still did not balance or reconcile.

One poll worker commented, "Instructions were very poor – we were not told many details about how to close [account for the ballots]." Others commented that the poll worker training was inadequate.

Poll workers are often given less than 5 minutes of instruction in how to complete the chain-of-custody accountability forms. This instruction, if given at all, comes

at the end of a two-hour training session. Often workers are told at the end of training to just look over the forms before Election Day and read what has to be done. The impact of this lack of priority to accounting for the security and location of ballots and memory cards is painfully obvious from the examples in this report.

SAVE R VOTE STRONGLY RECOMMENDS AT LEAST ONE FULL HOUR BE DEVOTED TO INSTRUCTING WORKERS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF AND HOW TO COMPLETE ALL CHAIN-OF-CUSTODY DOCUMENTS. WHEN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY IS BROKEN, THE EVIDENCE CAN NOT BE ADMITTED IN COURT. WHY SHOULD IT BE ADMITTED IN AN AMERICAN ELECTION?

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PART I
Security and Chain-of-Custody Issues
Discussion and Documentation

OBSERVATIONS:

- 1) *Voting machines are left unattended* in public locations for up to 11 days before the election, making them vulnerable to tampering or theft.
- 2) There was *no documentation of when machines left the ROV warehouse or when they were returned to the warehouse* by the four transportation companies used to deliver and pick up the 700+ machines to and from the precincts.

DOCUMENTATION:

- 1) **Equipment Delivery Receipts**
 - a) A review of the Equipment Delivery Receipts disclosed that in three locations, Precinct numbers 56913, 38027 and 38028, the DREs were delivered to public bathrooms as the “secure location”. Since public bathrooms typically allow for locking for privacy, anyone can enter the bathroom, lock the door, and spend the 5 minutes necessary to tamper with the DRE.
 - b) Further review indicated no accounting for the subsequent pickup and return of the voting units from the precincts to the ROV warehouse.
- 2) **Transfer Company Receipts**
 - a) These “receipts” are somewhat of a misnomer as they are essentially a log, maintained by the ROV warehouse, regarding the pickup from and return to the warehouse of the DREs by the transportation companies. Inexplicably the form does not contain a column for recording the date and time the DREs left the warehouse. It does contain a column for the date (but not the time) each of the DREs was returned to the warehouse; however, the date column is left blank on virtually every line.
 - b) There is a box on the forms that is checked with an “X” indicating the DRE was picked up and another box with an “X” indicating it was returned. Some of the boxes have been “whited-out” and an “X” then placed where the box had been. Further, there were instances where some lines were highlighted in yellow, some in purple, and the ROV had no explanation as to the significance or the reason for the alterations or highlighting.
 - c) One or more of the required signatures and dates of the transportation company representative and the ROV warehouse person is/are missing on the Transfer Company Receipt (AKA log). The signatures and date are required for both the pickup the DREs from the warehouse and the return of the DREs to the warehouse. Failure to complete this certification is a breach of the chain of custody of the machines. As a

result, for periods of time, the whereabouts of the DREs cannot be vouched for.

SAMPLE DOCUMENT #1 – Delivered to bathroom & no post- election signatures or date regarding the security and pick-up of DRE.

05/28/2008 17:26 COROVAN FULLERTON

(FAX)7144497567

P.016/U4U

244

Consolidated Statewide Direct Primary Election
June 3rd, 2008



Equipment Delivery Receipt

Cor-O-Van

PRECINCT # - 56-913		Purple B 2
Delivery Address:	Contact:	Route Name Stop
Nuview Branch Library Corner of Lakeview & 10th St 29990 Lakeview Ave Nuevo, CA 92567-9180	Louise Gutierrez-Library Manager (951)928-0769	
	Delivery Instructions:	Closed Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday & Sunday. Open Monday & Friday 10a-6p and Wednesday 3p-7p.

Equipment to be delivered

Edge # -	42422
Voting Booths -	5 Silver and 1 Gray
Chairs -	0
Tables -	0

This section to be completed by the person receiving the voting equipment prior to election day. It is very important that all fields are completed and that the voting equipment is stored in a secured (locked preferred) area.

Secure Storage Location:

Bathroom

Please describe the location where the voting equipment will be stored until Election Day.

Receipt Signature:

Louise Gutierrez
Signature is to confirm delivery; does not assume liability.

Date of delivery:

5/28/08

Printed Name:

Time of delivery:

2:38 pm

Special notes or comments:

Post-Election Pick Up Information:

Equipment to pick up:

Edge # -	42422
Voting Booths -	5 Silver and 1 Gray
Chairs -	0
Tables -	0

Receipt Signature: _____

Date / Time of pick up: _____

Sample Document #2 – Transfer Company Receipt (log) showing absence of time and dates for pick up and delivery of individual DREs. Also note erasures indicated by an “X” with no box outlining it and unexplained color coding of certain entries in the log. ROV unable to explain color coding.



Transfer Company Receipt


Consolidated Presidential Primary
 June 3rd, 2008

Cor-O-Van

#	Precinct	Edge #	Edge Picked Up	Edge Returned	Date Returned	Comments
88	22-090	42266	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
89	22-091	42267	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
90 -	22-825	42268	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
91	22-901	42269	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
92 -	22-905	42270	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
93 -	23-002	42271	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
94	23-004	42272	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
95	23-005	42273	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
96	23-007	42274	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
97	23-010	42275	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
98	23-013	42276	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
99	23-014	42277	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
100	23-016	42278	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
101	23-017	42279	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
102	23-018	42280	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
103	23-020	42281	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
104	23-023	42282	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
105	23-024	42283	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
106	32-904	42284	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
107	33-901	42285	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
108	35-702	42286	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
109 -	35-705	42287	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
110 -	35-706	42288	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
111	35-798	42289	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
112	35-854	42290	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
113	35-856	42291	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
114	35-858	42292	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
115	35-863	42293	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
116	35-866	42294	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		

Sample Document #3 - Transfer Company Receipt (log) showing absence of signatures by Transportation Company representative on both lines related to pick up and return of the DREs. Also lacking is the signature of the ROV Warehouse person for the return of the entire list of DREs.

It should be noted that no criminal background checks are provided to the County for any of the dozens of transportation company employees who handle this equipment.



Riverside County
Registrar of Voters

Transfer Company Receipt

Consolidated Presidential Primary
June 3rd, 2008

Golden West Moving Systems Inc.

#	Precinct	Edge #	Edge Picked Up	Edge Returned	Date Returned	Comments
146	21-911	42164	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
147	21-922	42165	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
148	21-951	42166	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
149	21-957	42167	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
150	21-958	42168	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
151	21-959	42169	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
152	21-961	42170	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
153	21-962	42171	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
154	21-963	42172	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
155	21-964	42173	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
156	21-966	42174	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
157	22-857	42175	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
158	22-858	42176	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
159	51-980	42177	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
160	51-986	42178	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		

of Tables: # of Chairs: # of Voting Booths: # of Handicap Booths:

Pick Up Signatures: _____
Transfer Company (Sign and Print) Paul C. Hook Paul C. Hook
R.O.V. (Sign and Print)

Return Signatures: _____
Transfer Company (Sign and Print) R.O.V. (Sign and Print)

Total number of Edges: 160

OBSERVATIONS:

- 3) **Many precinct workers failed to complete the required reconciliation documents accurately as required by Election Code Section 14405 (b) which states the full precinct board shall complete the required forms including the EC Code Section 14107 requirement attesting to the number of voters who voted at that precinct.**
 - a) Upon the closing of the polls, the precinct workers are required to perform a count of regular and provisional ballots cast by paper and by DRE, and then to record the total numbers of such ballots on a reconciliation form. The precinct workers also certify the total of number of voters who cast ballots at that precinct. Additionally, the number of unused paper ballots is required to be counted and then recorded on the reconciliation form. The number of paper ballot votes cast should then be added to the number of unused and spoiled paper ballots and reconciled to the number of paper ballots received by the precinct.
 - b) That this process be completed fully and accurately is essential in the chain of custody of paper ballots. Any omission of a step, inaccuracy in a total, or a failure to reconcile the counts back to the number of paper ballots received is a serious breach in the chain of custody. The ROV after receiving the documents from the precincts after the election, should check each reconciliation sheet from each precinct to make certain that the number of ballots voted, spoiled and unused is accurate and reconciles as described above. Failure to do so means that the count of voted and unused ballots is not verifiable in a post-election audit and that the whereabouts of ballots can not be determined.
 - c) We noted that the ROV has prohibited precinct workers from recording the number of total ballots received at the precinct on the reconciliation form (the box now reads “For Office Use Only”). In the February election, workers were required to

record that number so that a full and complete reconciliation could be performed in the precinct. Without the number of ballots received at each of the precincts, **it is now impossible to reconcile their counts of voted and unused ballots with the number of ballots received from the ROV. Large numbers of unaccounted-for ballots result from this violation of universal standards of accounting.**


- d) Similarly, the ROV does not require an accounting of provisional ballots that were provided to the precincts for the election. The precincts receive 125 provisional ballots, but are not required to reconcile the numbers of used and unused provisionals at the close of the polls. The ROV has not provided any reconciliation of counts of the provisional ballots voted and unused from the precincts. It is apparent that absent any accounting for the provisional ballots, the chain of custody has been broken and the opportunity for potential misuse of provisional ballots has been needlessly created.
- e) Our review of the reconciliation documents revealed that a high proportion of them contained one or more serious errors. Moreover, many of the reconciliation forms have been “corrected” by ROV staff in an effort to bring the forms into balance; however, even after these “corrections” the counts still don’t balance.
- f) In some precincts, the inspector failed to complete the reconciliation form, or failed to sign below the statement that attests to the accuracy of the information provided.

Examples of these failures are as follows:

DOCUMENTATION:

February 2008 Reconciliation effort reveals 129 ballots missing and 4 voters who signed roster to vote but whose ballots were apparently lost. The audit of these individual precinct documents revealed a significant number of problems of this nature. Numbers are changed without explanation and still there is no accurate accounting for all the ballots.

ELECTRONIC/PAPER BALLOT STATEMENT
(EC 14405)

Voting Unit #	Place the Tamper-Evident Seal from each voting unit below	Qualified Votes	Provisional Votes	Total Votes
42023		5	0	5

ELECTRONIC ROSTER ACCOUNTING
(EC 14405)

Electronic Signatures in Combined Roster and Index A-L (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters)	+	454
Electronic Signatures in Combined Roster and Index M-Z (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters)	+	118 118
Electronic Signatures in Curbside Voter Roster (M-Z pocket)	+	1
Electronic Authorized Voter Signatures	+	4
Total	=	273 273
Signatures in Electronic Provisional Roster		0

These #s MUST add up to the #s in the top boxes. These were reduced from 154 and 118 signatures per poll workers to zero by ROV HQ staff w/o explanation.

PAPER ROSTER ACCOUNTING
(EC 14405)

Total Number of Paper Ballots Received		615
Number of ballots UNUSED	+	210
Number of ballots SPOILED	+	13
Number of VOTED ballots found in the ballot box (DO NOT include Provisional Ballots or Vote-by-Mail ballots)	+	263
Total	=	486
Paper Signatures in Combined Roster and Index A-L (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters)	+	150
Paper Signatures in Combined Roster and Index M-Z (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters)	+	117
Paper Signatures in Curbside Voter Roster (M-Z pocket)	+	0
Paper Authorized Voter Signatures	+	0
Total	=	267
Signatures in Paper Provisional Roster		16

-L: 146
1-2: 114
rbside = 1
uap = 10

129 MISSING BALLOTS
Total number of Paper Ballots Received (615) less those unused, spoiled, and voted = 486. Where are the other 129 ballots?

What happened to the other four voters who signed in to vote?

IMPORTANT NOTICE: YOU MUST COMPLETE THIS PAGE, AND COMPLETE AND SIGN THE OPPOSITE PAGE IN ORDER TO CONCLUDE YOUR DUTIES AS AN ELECTION OFFICER AND RECEIVE YOUR STIPEND.

February 2008 Election

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION (EC 14107)

INFORMATION ONLY

Blue envelopes (containing voted paper Provisional ballots) from inside the ballot box.	16
Surrendered Vote-by-Mail ballots (marked "Do Not Count Voted at the Polls")	0
Dropped Off Vote-by-Mail ballots from inside ballot box.	46

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that all voters whose signatures appear hereinbefore in this roster voted this day except the following who, after signing the roster, failed to vote or were challenged and denied the right to vote:

Per instructions below, this number should be 272, NOT 330, which over-reports voters who voted by 58 voters, or a 21% over-reporting of voters.

Name	A-L
	M-Z
GREENGLAIBLE, MICHAEL ROBERT	A-L

WE FURTHER CERTIFY that the number of voters who voted in this precinct at this election is 330 and that the above list of voters, less those who did not vote as enumerated above, constitutes the roster of this precinct for this election.

TO PRECINCT OFFICERS: To determine the number of voters who voted in this precinct do the following:
 Determine the number of voters who signed the Combined Roster and Index A-L, M-Z, Curbside Roster and Authorized Voters Roster.
 Subtract all voters that were not allowed to vote if any
EQUALS TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTERS

WE FURTHER CERTIFY that the total number of official ballots received, voted, rejected, spoiled and cancelled, found in the ballot container and the number accounted for is as indicated on the Ballot Statement.

WE FURTHER CERTIFY that the Assisted Voters List and Challenge List show a complete list of all voters assisted or challenged.

Attention: All Precinct Officers including Student Pollworkers must sign below.

Inspector Daniel F. Allen

Pct Officer [Signature]

Pct Officer Sarah [Signature]

Pct Officer [Signature]

Pct Officer Julianne L. Gulik

Pct Officer _____

**June 3, 2008 Election Reconciliation Form comes up short 173 Ballots
ELECTRONIC/PAPER BALLOT STATEMENT SHEET**

ELECTRONIC/PAPER BALLOT STATEMENT
(EC 14405)

IMPORTANT NOTICE: YOU MUST COMPLETE THIS PAGE, AND COMPLETE AND SIGN THE PREVIOUS PAGE IN ORDER TO CONCLUDE YOUR DUTIES AS AN ELECTION OFFICER AND RECEIVE YOUR STIPEND.

Voting Unit #	Place the Tamper-Evident Seal from each voting unit below	Qualified Votes	Provisional Votes	Total Votes
	Place Tamper-Evident Seal Here	38	0	38

ELECTRONIC ROSTER ACCOUNTING
(EC 14405)

Electronic Signatures in Combined Roster and Index A-L (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters)	+ 54	52'
Electronic Signatures in Combined Roster and Index M-Z (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters)	+ 31	33'
Electronic Signatures in Curbside Voter Roster (M-Z pocket)	+ 0	✓
Electronic Signatures in Authorized Voters Roster	+ 0	
Total	= 85	85'

PAPER ROSTER ACCOUNTING
(EC 14405)

Total Number of Paper Ballots Received	For Office Use Only	
Number of ballots UNUSED	+ 491	
Number of ballots SPOILED	+ 1	
Number of VOTED ballots found in the ballot box (DO NOT include Provisional Ballots or Vote-by-Mail ballots)		
Total	=	
Paper Signatures in Combined Roster and Index A-L (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters)	+ 84	0
Paper Signatures in Combined Roster and Index M-Z (Include Inactive and Supplemental Voters)	+ 35	20
Paper Signatures in Curbside Voter Roster (M-Z pocket)	+ 0	✓
Paper Signatures in Authorized Voters Roster	+ 0	
Total	= 85	55' 20'

PROVISIONAL BALLOT ACCOUNTING

Signatures in Paper Provisional Roster	124	10
Signatures in Electronic Provisional Roster		0

For instructions on completing this form refer to pages 80-90 in your Election Officer Handbook.

Place the "YELLOW" copy of this document in the Brown Voted Ballot Carton.

NOTE: Workers at Precinct 11413 (Fire Station #10 in Riverside) reported ZERO electronic ballots cast (top of page), but central office added in 38 electronic votes in green ink. However, central office also reported 85 voters signed in to vote electronically. Workers failed to place tamper-evident seal at top and failed to report DRE machine number. Paper provisional roster signatures are reported as 124 by workers, and changed to 10 (or 1 or 0?) by central staff. There are NO voted paper ballots reported, yet workers reported 85 voters signed the roster to vote on paper ballots. Central office staff altered 85 to 20. Ballot inventory forms showed 685 [For Office Use Only] blank ballots signed for by precinct inspector to be used at precinct. Above report shows only 491 unused ballots (and one spoiled), which should mean that 193 paper ballots were cast. If central office figures of only 20 are

correct, then there are 173 unaccounted-for ballots in this precinct alone.

JUNE 3, 2008 ELECTION – BLANK, UNCERTIFIED AND UNSIGNED STATEMENT OF NUMBER OF VOTERS WHO CAST BALLOTS AT THE SAME PRECINCT 11413 ILLUSTRATED ABOVE. THIS VIOLATES ELECTION CODE SECTION 14107 REQUIRING COMPLETION AND CERTIFICATION BY THE PRECINCT BOARD.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION
(EC 14107)

INFORMATION ONLY

Blue envelopes (containing voted paper Provisional ballots) from inside the ballot box.	
Surrendered Vote-by-Mail ballots (marked "Do Not Count Voted at the Polls")	
Dropped Off Vote-by-Mail ballots from inside ballot box.	

NOTE TO PRECINCT OFFICERS: To determine the number of voters who voted in this precinct do the following:
• Determine the number of voters (Paper and Electronic) that signed the Certified Roster and Index, A-L, M-Z, Curbside Roster and Authorized Voters Roster.
Subtract all voters that were not allowed to vote if any.
EQUALS TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTERS

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that all voters whose signatures appear hereinbefore in this roster voted this day except the following who, after signing the roster, failed to vote or were challenged and denied the right to vote:

Name	A-L	M-Z

WE FURTHER CERTIFY that the number of voters who voted in this precinct at this election is (_____), and that the above list of voters, less those who did not vote as enumerated above, constitutes the roster of this precinct for this election.

WE FURTHER CERTIFY that the total number of official ballots received, voted, rejected, spoiled and cancelled, found in the ballot container and the number accounted for is as indicated on the Ballot Statement.

WE FURTHER CERTIFY that the Assisted Voters List and Challenge List show a complete list of all voters assisted or challenged.

Attention: All Precinct Officers including Student Pollworkers must sign below.


Inspector **X** _____ Pct Officer **X** _____
Pct Officer **X** _____ Pct Officer **X** _____
Pct Officer **X** _____ Pct Officer **X** _____

Failure of precinct inspector and all precinct workers to complete, sign and certify this document is a major break in the chain of custody necessary to validate election results. Blank documents can easily be filled in later with any number rendering the entire process compromised.

JUNE 3, 2008 ELECTION – SAME PRECINCT # 11413 - REPLACEMENT SEAL LOG SHOWS TWO REPLACEMENT SEALS WERE APPARENTLY REMOVED FROM THE DRE [DRE UNIT # NOT RECORDED AS REQUIRED] WITHOUT ANY AUTHORITY TO DO SO, NO DATE AND TIME, INITIALS OR REPLACEMENT SEAL NUMBER RECORDED. ALL THIS DESPITE VERY CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS.




Replacement Seal Log

IMPORTANT NOTICE: In the event that you are instructed by an official agent of the Registrar of Voters to remove the Tamper-Evident seal from the voting unit, the following procedures must be followed:
 Record in the column provided the name of the person the Replacement seal was Authorized by, and the Voting Unit Number from this unit for which the seal is being removed. Remove the Tamper-Evident seal (as shown on the photo below) from the long cartridge door and place it on the appropriate column of the log. Take a replacement seal, record on the log the Replacement Seal Number, and place it on the long cartridge door where the prior seal had been. Record on the last column the time this event took place and your initials.



County of Riverside
Registrar of Voters

034950

Replacement Authorized By:	Voting Unit #	Place the Tamper-Evident Seal removed from unit, below	Replacement Seal #	Time Replaced
Jeff Smith Registrar of Voters	5597	 County of Riverside Registrar of Voters 034950	034950	6-53 A.M. JES
		 County of Riverside Registrar of Voters 034950		
		 County of Riverside Registrar of Voters 034950		

JUNE 3, 2008 ELECTION – SAME PRECINCT # 11413 – FIRST VOTER CHECKLIST REQUIRED TO BE SURE NO BALLOTS ARE RECORDED ELECTRONICALLY BEFORE THE FIRST BALLOT IS CAST. THERE IS NO INDICATION OF THE REQUIRED VOTING UNIT NUMBER, THUS THE SIGNATURES CANNOT IMMEDIATELY BE TIED TO THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY FOR THIS VOTING UNIT.

First Voter Procedural Checklist

California Elections Code 14215, requires that before issuing or receiving any ballots, the Inspector of the Precinct Board must open, exhibit, and close the ballot container(s). The following procedural checklist must be completed by a Precinct Inspector for the "First Voter" that arrives at the Polling Place once his/her eligibility has been established.

After processing and obtaining all required documentation from the 1st eligible voter, have him/her verify that the blue ballot box is empty. Then walk the voter to the voting units and record the voting unit number on the "Public Counter Verification" list below. Show the 1st voter the screen of each screen identified as the "Public Counter". "0" (zero) in the lower left corner of each screen identified as the "Public Counter".

		Inspector Initials	
Ballot Box Verification		Yes	No
Ballot Box is Empty?		X	
Ballot Box is Locked?		X	

Voting Unit Number	Public Counter Verification	Inspector Initials	
		Yes	No
	Does the screen display a zero on the public counter?	X	

First Voter: Tom Johnson [Signature] 06 / 03 / 2008
Print Name Signature Month Day Year

Checklist completed by: [Signature] [Signature] 06 / 03 / 2008
Inspector Month Day Year

OBSERVATION:

4) Over 98% of precinct inspectors failed to count the paper ballots issued to them as instructed by the ROV's Election Officer's Handbook resulting in a lack of ability to account for all ballots.

a) The ROV's written instructions require that precinct inspectors count the ballots received from the ROV when given to them at

the training session. A form (the Ballot Inventory form) is provided to each inspector. The inspector, in the presence of the trainer or other ROV staff who acts as a verifier, is required to hand-count the ballots and record the number on the line of the respective party. The ROV has recorded the number of ballots issued for each party, as well as the total number of ballots for the precinct, on the form. The hand-written count of the inspector must match the ROV's numbers for the individual parties and the precinct as a whole.

b) A review of the completed Ballot Inventory Forms revealed that the vast majority of the forms had neither numbers filled in on the lines for the respective parties, nor for the precinct totals. It appears that most inspectors simply signed the form without performing the essential count of ballots. Without a count of how many ballots were actually received, it is not possible to perform reconciliation at the conclusion of the election process. The failure to perform the required ballot count constitutes a serious breach of the chain of custody for the ballots. Bank tellers must always account for beginning cash, but precinct inspectors are not accounting for beginning number of ballots.

c) In those precincts where counts were performed there were instances where the inspectors' ballot count did not match the ROV's numbers. The samples below reflect a "shorted" amount of 923 ballots on just the few samples shown.

d) Instances where neither the inspector nor a verifier signed the form were observed. In some cases, the inspector did sign the form, but no signature appears for a verifier. Instances where neither signed left literally thousands of ballots unaccounted for. If ballots are being retained at ROV headquarters, whether purposely or by inadvertence, not only is the chain of custody broken but serious questions arise regarding why this is not accounted for.

e) The instructions to the precinct inspectors pertaining to the count are, in our estimation, inadequate. No part of the instruction, either in the Handbook or on the Ballot Inventory

form, indicates what an inspector is supposed to do when his/her count does not match the numbers recorded by the ROV.

f) We are not aware of any follow-up to these serious deficiencies by the ROV. Obviously, the ROV should follow-up with any inspector who fails to perform the required ballot count. The ROV should also have in place a process whereby discrepancies in the precinct and ROV can be immediately reported and resolved. These same lapses in chain of custody occurred in the February election.

DOCUMENTATION:

This is one of (the nine) few of the 1,440 Ballot Inventory Forms completed correctly. It CAN be done!



BARBARA DUNMORE
Registrar of Voters

DOUGLAS C. KINZLE
Assistant Registrar

County of Riverside
REGISTRAR OF VOTERS
2724 Gateway Drive, Riverside, California 92507-0923

Office: (951) 486-7200
Fax: (951) 486-7272
TTY: (951) 653-3718
Toll Free: (800) 773-8683

BALLOT INVENTORY
CONSOLIDATED STATEWIDE DIRECT PRIMARY ELECTION
JUNE 3, 2008

Ballot inventory instructions:

- 1) Open the sealed ballot carton and count the total ballots received by party.
- 2) Record the number of ballots received in the Actual column provided on both copies of the Ballot Inventory.
- 3) Sign and date this form in the space provided below.
 - a. Seal the ballot carton with a standard seal.
- 4) Keep the yellow copy for your records.

Precinct number: 14044

Sequence number: 0172

Party	Total Ballots	
	Qty	Actual
Democratic	200	200
Republican	300	300
Nonpartisan	200	200
Democratic-DTS	150	150
Republican-DTS	150	150
Libertarian	10	10

Total Ballots 1010

I have counted the official ballots issued to me and have received the amount recorded in the Actual column above.

Lynda Clark Fujino
Signature of Precinct Inspector

5/22/08
Date

I have verified the number of official ballots issued to the Precinct Inspector and concur with the number stated above.

[Signature]
Signature of Verifier

5/22/08
Date

White: Return to Registrar of Voters in the envelope provided
Yellow: Keep for your records

Precinct 52104 – No signature by Inspector or Verifier for 510 ballots. Who had custody, where, and for how long?



BARBARA DUNMORE
Registrar of Voters

DOUGLAS C. KINZLE
Assistant Registrar

County of Riverside

REGISTRAR OF VOTERS
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BALLOT INVENTORY CONSOLIDATED STATEWIDE DIRECT PRIMARY ELECTION JUNE 3, 2008

Ballot inventory instructions:

- 1) Open the sealed ballot carton and count the total ballots received by party.
- 2) Record the number of ballots received in the Actual column provided on both copies of the Ballot Inventory.
- 3) Sign and date this form in the space provided below.
 - a. Seal the ballot carton with a standard seal.
- 4) Keep the yellow copy for your records.

Precinct number: 52104

Sequence number: 1005

Party	Total Ballots	
	Qty	Actual
Democratic	150	
Republican	150	
Nonpartisan	100	
Democratic-DTS	50	
Republican-DTS	50	
Libertarian	10	

Total Ballots 510

I have counted the official ballots issued to me and have received the amount recorded in the Actual column above.

Signature of Precinct Inspector

Date

I have verified the number of official ballots issued to the Precinct Inspector and concur with the number stated above.

Signature of Verifier

Date

NOTE: PRECINCT 52504 WAS LIKewise UNSIGNED FOR IN THE AMOUNT OF 810 BALLOTS. THE SAME QUESTIONS APPLY – WHO HAD THEM, WHERE, WHEN & FOR HOW LONG?

PRECINCT 55860 – REFLECTS RECEIPT OF ONLY 53 BALLOTS OUT OF 810 STATED BY ROV TO HAVE BEEN DELIVERED. CERTIFIED BY THE PRECINCT INSPECTOR AND VERIFIER.



BARBARA DUNMORE
Registrar of Voters

DOUGLAS C. KINZLE
Assistant Registrar

County of Riverside

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Toll Free: (800) 773-861

BALLOT INVENTORY
CONSOLIDATED STATEWIDE DIRECT PRIMARY ELECTION
JUNE 3, 2008

Ballot inventory instructions:

- 1) Open the sealed ballot carton and count the total ballots received by party.
- 2) Record the number of ballots received in the Actual column provided on both copies of the Ballot Inventory.
- 3) Sign and date this form in the space provided below.
 - a. Seal the ballot carton with a standard seal.
- 4) Keep the yellow copy for your records.

Precinct number: 55860

Sequence number: 1142

Party	Total Ballots	
	Qty	Actual
Democratic	300	31
Republican	150	10
Nonpartisan	150	2
Democratic-DTS	100	1
Republican-DTS	100	1
Libertarian	10	
		53

Total Ballots 810

I have counted the official ballots issued to me and have received the amount recorded in the Actual column above.

Don Wall
Signature of Precinct Inspector

6-3-08
Date

I have verified the number of official ballots issued to the Precinct Inspector and concur with the number stated above.

Deen Wall
Signature of Verifier

6/3/08
Date

PRECINCT 57609 REFLECTS RECEIPT OF ONLY 695 BALLOTS INSTEAD OF 760 REPORTED DELIVERED BY THE ROV.



BARBARA DUNMORE
Registrar of Voters

DOUGLAS C. KINZLE
Assistant Registrar

County of Riverside

REGISTRAR OF VOTERS
2724 Gateway Drive, Riverside, California 92507-0923

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Fax: (951) 486-720
TTY: (951) 653-371
Toll Free: (800) 773-868

BALLOT INVENTORY
CONSOLIDATED STATEWIDE DIRECT PRIMARY ELECTION
JUNE 3, 2008

Ballot inventory instructions:

- 1) Open the sealed ballot carton and count the total ballots received by party.
- 2) Record the number of ballots received in the Actual column provided on both copies of the Ballot Inventory.
- 3) Sign and date this form in the space provided below.
 - a. Seal the ballot carton with a standard seal.
- 4) Keep the yellow copy for your records.

Precinct number: 57609

Sequence number: 1165

Party	Total Ballots	
	Qty	Actual
Democratic	200	168
Republican	200	170
Nonpartisan	150	147
Democratic-DTS	100	100
Republican-DTS	100	100
Libertarian	10	10

Total Ballots ~~760~~ 695

I have counted the official ballots issued to me and have received the amount recorded in the Actual column above.

Signature of Precinct Inspector

6-3-08
Date

I have verified the number of official ballots issued to the Precinct Inspector and concur with the number stated above.

Signature of Verifier

Date

OBSERVATION:

5) A number of the brown "voted-ballot" cartons that also contained the electronic results cartridge (memory card), which must be sealed pursuant to State and County regulations to prevent tampering, arrived at the collection centers and the ROV office without seals or with broken seals and without bar codes. Several results cartridges were missing for days, in one case 4 days.

DOCUMENTATION:

This log reflects the date and time various initially missing cartridges were located and accounted for

Consolidated Statewide Direct Primary June 3, 2008 Machine Processed Report Riverside County						
Precinct Name		Polling Place-Edge		Processed		
30100	41902	6/4/08 6/4/08	S	0/1	0.00%	
37726	41575	<input type="checkbox"/> 6/7/08 1:35 pm	NT	0/1	0.00%	Found in machine
1157	42074	<input type="checkbox"/> 6/4/08 1:54 pm	S	0/1	0.00%	Red bag
24312	42134	<input type="checkbox"/> 6/6/08 2:20 pm	S	0/1	0.00%	Found in machine
11912	42184	<input type="checkbox"/> ✓		0/1	0.00%	Rolls never opened
22016	42221	<input type="checkbox"/> 6/6/08 1:40 pm	NT	0/1	0.00%	Found in machine
35854	42293	<input type="checkbox"/> 6/4/08 1:47 AM	NT	0/1	0.00%	
55004	42455	<input type="checkbox"/> 6/4/08 1:54 PM	S	0/1	0.00%	Found in Red Bag
Total Polling Place-Edge Machines Processed:				0/12	0.00%	
47005	42557	<input type="checkbox"/>		0/1	0.00%	Bank in by the "used"
47010	42559	<input type="checkbox"/>		0/1	0.00%	
47011	42562	<input type="checkbox"/>		0/1	0.00%	
47118	42563	<input type="checkbox"/>		0/1	0.00%	

Precinct 37726 – “Voted ballots NOT placed in Brown Box” raising question of where were the voted ballots and how were they secured?

VOTING PRECINCT 37726

TIME RETURNED 9:30

TO BE COMPLETED BY INSPECTOR

FOR COLLECTION CENTER STAFF USE

Inspector, confirm the following by completing the checklist before leaving the Polling Place.

Issue a copy of this signed and completed receipt upon your documented confirmation of the following:

I HAVE:

- Applied adhesive seal to the Voted Ballot Carton(s)
- Applied adhesive seal to the Un-voted Ballot Carton(s)
- Enclosed (A-L, M-Z) Combined Roster and Index
- Enclosed Provisional Voter Roster(s)
- Applied seal to red bag
- Blue Ballot Box with supplies

- Voted Ballot Carton(s)
- Un-voted Ballot Carton(s)
- Roster flex test
- Red Bag sealed
- Blue Ballot Box

As necessary indicate below:

- Opened/Resealed red bag

Notes: Cartridge was left in Printer; Voted Brown Ballots were not placed in Brown Box
Yelma L. DeGuzman
 COLLECTION CENTER STAFF SIGNATURE

UYNHQA HOOD
 INSPECTOR SIGNATURE
UYNHQA HOOD
 INSPECTOR PRINT NAME
Kyrith Rugh
 PRECINCT OFFICER SIGNATURE
Kyrith Rugh
 PRECINCT OFFICER PRINT NAME

Precinct 11212 – Voted Ballot Carton not sealed right and no bar code resulting in a clear break in chain of custody.

VOTING PRECINCT 11-212

TIME RETURNED 7:22

TO BE COMPLETED BY INSPECTOR

FOR COLLECTION CENTER STAFF USE

Inspector, confirm the following by completing the checklist before leaving the Polling Place.

Issue a copy of this signed and completed receipt upon your documented confirmation of the following:

I HAVE :

- Applied adhesive seal to the Voted Ballot Carton(s)
- Applied adhesive seal to the Un-voted Ballot Carton(s)
- Enclosed (A-L, M-Z) Combined Roster and Index
- Enclosed Provisional Voter Roster(s)
- Applied seal to red bag
- Blue Ballot Box with supplies

- Voted Ballot Carton(s) *no bar code; not sealed right*
- Un-voted Ballot Carton(s)
- Roster flex test
- Red Bag sealed
- Blue Ballot Box *not locked*

As necessary indicate below:

- Opened/Resealed red bag

Notes: _____

Mary Wait
INSPECTOR SIGNATURE
Mary Wait
INSPECTOR PRINT NAME
James Washington
PRECINCT OFFICER SIGNATURE
Illus Washington
PRECINCT OFFICER PRINT NAME

Carol Jo
COLLECTION CENTER STAFF SIGNATURE

Precinct 21883 "Brown Voted-Ballot carton seal broken – used emergency seal." No explanation is offered for reason seal is broken thus tampering could have occurred before or during transport.

ELECTION COLLECTIONS RECEIPT

JUNE 3, 2008

VOTING PRECINCT 21-883

TIME RETURNED 9:30

TO BE COMPLETED BY INSPECTOR

FOR COLLECTION CENTER STAFF USE

Inspector, confirm the following by completing the checklist before leaving the Polling Place.

Issue a copy of this signed and completed receipt upon your documented confirmation of the following:

I HAVE:

- Applied adhesive seal to the Voted Ballot Carton(s)
- Applied adhesive seal to the Un-voted Ballot Carton(s)
- Enclosed (A-L, M-Z) Combined Roster and Index
- Enclosed Provisional Voter Roster(s)
- Applied seal to red bag
- Blue Ballot Box with supplies

- Voted Ballot Carton(s)
- Un-voted Ballot Carton(s)
- Roster flex test
- Red Bag sealed
- Blue Ballot Box
- Opened/Resealed red bag

As necessary indicate below:

Carol Morgan
INSPECTOR SIGNATURE
Latina Anselmi
INSPECTOR PRINT NAME
Paol M. Channello
PRECINCT OFFICER SIGNATURE
PATRICK BERG
PRECINCT OFFICER PRINT NAME

Notes: ballot box unlocked - voted carton
Seal broken - used emergency seal
[Signature]
COLLECTION CENTER STAFF SIGNATURE

Inspector, after completion of the checklist place this Election Collections Receipt into the precinct ID tag located on the handle of the red bag.

ECR Revised 04/02/2008

Precinct 35-894 reported “Only one of two” ballot cartons was sealed leaving the question whether it was the “brown voted-ballots” carton was unsealed or the “white unused-ballots” carton. In either case, failure to seal either carton is a violation of chain-of-custody requirements.

ELECTION COLLECTIONS RECEIPT VOTING PRECINCT <u>35-894</u>	JUNE 3, 2008 TIME RETURNED <u>10:02</u>
TO BE COMPLETED BY INSPECTOR	FOR COLLECTION CENTER STAFF USE
Inspector, confirm the following by completing the checklist before leaving the Polling Place. I HAVE :	Issue a copy of this signed and completed receipt upon your documented confirmation of the following:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Applied adhesive seal to the Voted Ballot Carton(s) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Applied adhesive seal to the Un-voted Ballot Carton(s) <i>only one of two</i> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enclosed (A-L, M-Z) Combined Roster and Index <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enclosed Provisional Voter Roster(s) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Applied seal to red bag <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Blue Ballot Box with supplies	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Voted Ballot Carton(s) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Un-voted Ballot Carton(s) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Roster flex test <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Red Bag sealed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Blue Ballot Box As necessary indicate below: <input type="checkbox"/> Opened/Resealed red bag
_____ CHARRETTE POUBLON <small>INSPECTOR SIGNATURE</small> _____ Charrette Poublon <small>INSPECTOR PRINT NAME</small> _____ S. Sam Alvo <small>PRECINCT OFFICER SIGNATURE</small> _____ Sam Alvo <small>PRECINCT OFFICER PRINT NAME</small>	Notes: _____ _____ <small>COLLECTION CENTER STAFF SIGNATURE</small>
<small>Inspector, after completion of the checklist place this Election Collections Receipt into the precinct ID tag located on the handle of the red bag.</small>	<small>ECR Revised 04/02/2008</small>

OBSERVATION:

6) Some of the 22 collection sites, where precinct inspectors bring their ballots and voting machine memory cards after the polls close, have consistently failed to account for the items brought to them from the precincts, with the ROV’s collection center being the prime example of failure to account for items delivered to it.

The place where some of the most hands are involved with the ballots and the electronic results cartridges is at the (regional) collection centers. It is here that if there are items missing, or security seals not applied and bar codes not read, the responsibility is placed squarely on the collection center staff. Any “free pass” issued or failure to inspect and confirm by collection center staff is a major violation of the chain of

custody and E.C. Section 15405 (a) which states in part “...The officers receiving returned ballots shall *compel* this accounting.” [SRV emphasis added] **The above items are each critical to the integrity of the election process and, therefore, require the strictest security and accountability measures.**

- a) Prior to leaving the precinct, the inspector completes the **Election Collections Receipt form** on which is printed the several items that are to be delivered to the assigned collection center. By placing check marks on the left side of the form, the precinct inspector confirms that each specified item is being sent to the collection center
- b) After the ballots have been counted and reconciled at the precinct, they and the results cartridge are transported to one of 22 regional collection centers. Very specific procedures govern this transmittal process, including the “two-person” rule, as the ballots are vulnerable to tampering or theft while enroute.
- c) Failure to properly seal the items transported to the collection center jeopardizes the security of the items and, especially with regards to the ballot cartons, could lead to ballot tampering or theft.
- d) Most important is that the cartons in which the voted ballots and results cartridges have been placed are securely sealed. Sealing precludes loss or tampering, thereby protecting the chain of custody.
- e) Upon arrival at the collection center, a worker places check marks on the right side of the **Election Collections Receipt form** to confirm receipt of each item. The items include: 1) a brown, sealed carton that contains the voted ballots and the electronic results cartridge; 2) a white, sealed carton that contains the unvoted and spoiled ballots; 3) the red pouch in which the various rosters and the provisional and vote-by-mail ballots are contained; and 4) the blue ballot box that includes the e-voting card activation unit and the VeriVote Printer.
- f) Some of the receipt forms that were completed by collection center workers reflect improperly or unsealed ballot cartons and red pouches.
- g) The report regarding the Blythe precincts stated “all collections receipts done incorrectly x 4.”


- h) Another report revealed all election materials were transported “in open-bed truck”, a violation not noted for several elections.
- i) In a number of cases, collection center staff failed to complete the Election Collection Receipt form.
- j) After receiving the above items from the last precinct, collection center staff is required to complete a form that reflects receipt of the items from each precinct. This form is submitted to the ROV headquarters as a transmittal for delivery of the precincts’ material.
- k) Without this form, there is no record of the delivery of the election material to the ROV and a breach in the chain of custody results.
- l) In past elections, several collection centers failed to complete the transmittal document and, thereby, created a security issue and another break in the chain of custody. In the June election only Temecula and the **staff assigned to ROV collection center failed to complete this required document. This was the third consecutive election in which the ROV location failed to do so.**
- m) Failure by the collection center workers to mark the receipt form creates the impression that the items were not delivered and are unaccounted. In such a case, the security of and control over the ballots would appear to be compromised.
- n) Nine precincts failed to turn in ANY Election Collections Receipts and there was no notation by any of the Collection Center staff indicating the failure to receive the receipts. It raises the question of whether or when the election materials (ballots and results cartridges) came in from these precincts.

DOCUMENTATION:

There were no receipts for the following 9 precincts as indicated by ROV staff. This represents loss of chain of custody for hundreds, perhaps over 1,000 ballots. Failure to provide the Election Collections Receipt appears to represent multiple individual violations of EC Section 14404(a) which states, in part, “...officers receiving returned ballots shall compel this accounting...”

Precinct #	
11-719	recpt not found, assumed one of 8 blank
11-721	recpt not found, assumed one of 8 blank
18-603	recpt not found, assumed one of 8 blank
30-074	recpt not found, assumed one of 8 blank
30-992	recpt not found, assumed one of 8 blank
37-681	recpt not found, assumed one of 8 blank
49-016	recpt not found, assumed one of 8 blank
52-324	recpt not found, assumed one of 8 blank
52-521	recpt not found, assumed one of 8 blank

ROV Collection Center failed to complete any information on any of the 66 precincts that turned in ballots and memory cards to them. Note blank report. This leaves a break in the chain of custody of about 5,000 ballots. This collection center was the ONLY one of 22 NOT to complete this documentation. In previous elections as many as 5 Collection Centers failed to complete this accounting for incoming elections ballots, etc.

 Voting Precinct List by Report Group Consolidated Primary Election - June 03, 2008					
Report Group: Collection Center		Item: Registrar of Voters Office			
Voting Precinct	Comment	Voting Precinct	Comment	Voting Precinct	Comment
0011218		0011444		0052510	
0011219		0011927		0052512	
0011222		0011929			
0011224		0011930			
0011225		0011932			
0011227		0011980			
0011402		0052100			
0011404		0052101			
0011406		0052104			
0011408		0052105			
0011409		0052201			
0011411		0052202			
0011412		0052204			
0011413		0052207			
0011414		0052208			
0011415		0052212			
0011417		0052213			
0011418		0052217			
0011419		0052218			
0011420		0052219			
0011421		0052220			
0011422		0052221			
0011424		0052301			
0011428		0052304			
0011429		0052306			
0011430		0052307			
0011431		0052308			
0011433		0052329			
0011434		0052500			
0011436		0052504			
0011442		0052505			
0011443		0052506			



Voting Precinct List by Report Group

Consolidated Primary Election - June 03, 2008

Report Group: Collection Center

Item: Registrar of Voters Office

Voting Precinct

Voting Precinct

Comment

Voting Precinct

Comment

Total Voting Pcts for Registrar of Voters Office: 66

ROV Collection Center failed for the third consecutive election to complete any accounting for the ballots and results cartridges from a large number of precincts. In November 2007, they failed to account for 44 precincts and in February 2008 they failed to account for 47 precincts.

The Norco Collection Site did an outstanding job of documenting incoming voting materials indicating what arrived, when, and any problems.



Voting Precinct List by Report Group

Consolidated Primary Election - June 03, 2008

Report Group: Collection Center

Item: Riverside County DPSS-Norco

Voting Precinct	Comment	Voting Precinct	Comment	Voting Precinct	Comment
0021800	Red Bag + Box 8:57 ✓	0023023	Red Bag + Box 9:18 ✓		
0021815	Red Bag + Box 9:00 ✓	0023024	Red Bag + Box 9:09 ✓		
0021825	Red Bag + Box 9:34 ✓				
0021826	Red Bag + Box 9:13 ✓				
0021827	Red Bag + Box 9:16 ✓				
0021832	Red Bag + Box 8:55 ✓				
0021833	Red Bag + Box 9:37 ✓				
0021834	Red Bag + Box 8:59 ✓				
0021835	Red Bag + Box 8:36 ✓				
0021836	Red Bag + Box 10:13 ✓				
0021838	Red Bag + Box 9:30 ✓				
0021842	Red Bag + Box 9:38 ✓				
0022000	Red Bag + Box 8:56 ✓				
0022002	Red Bag + Box 9:44 ✓				
0022003	Red Bag + Box 10:10 ✓				
0022004	Red Bag + Box 9:13 ✓				
0022008	Red Bag + Box 9:55 ✓				
0022011	Red Bag + BDL 9:04 ✓				
0022012	Red Bag + Box 9:07 ✓				
0022014	Red Bag + Box 9:09 ✓				
0022016	Red Bag + Box 8:17 ✓		8:17 Box Not Sealed ✓		
0023002	Red Bag + Box 8:33 ✓				
0023004	Red Bag + Box 9:05 ✓				
0023005	Red Bag + Box 9:10 ✓				
0023007	Red Bag + Box 9:53 ✓				
0023010	Red Bag + Box 10:03 ✓				
0023013	Red Bag + Box 9:28 ✓				
0023014	Red Bag + Box 9:13 ✓				
0023016	Red Bag + Box 8:47 ✓				
0023017	Red Bag + Box 9:20 ✓				
0023018	Red Bag + Box 10:05 ✓				
0023020	Red Bag + Box 9:4 ✓				

The San Jacinto Library Collection Center did one of the best jobs of documenting problems (including lack of seals) with incoming cartons and bags. However, whenever any boxes come to the collection center not sealed, the chain-of-custody has been broken and the “pristine” status of the ballots contained therein cannot be vouched for.

Report Group: Collection Center		Item: San Jacinto Library	
Voting Precinct	Comment	Voting Precinct	Comment
0032904	9:06 p.m.		
0036002	9:33 p.m.		red bag not sealed
0036003	8:32 p.m.		
0036005	9:07 p.m.		
0036011	10:31 p.m.		red bag not sealed; inspector sealed ballot box
0036016	9:25 p.m.		white box in red bag - had to be resealed; white box sealed
0036019	8:46 p.m.		no # on blue ballot box
0036021	9:15 p.m.		
0036024	9:10 p.m.		needed to seal 2 white boxes
0036027	9:04 p.m.		
0036034	9:17 p.m.		needed to seal 2 white boxes
0036035	8:43 p.m.		red seal broken; no # on blue box
0036040	9:41 p.m.		needed to seal 1 of the white unused ballot boxes
0036042	8:51 p.m.		red bag not sealed because broken off
Total Voting Pcts for: San Jacinto Library 14			
Total Voting Pcts: 720			

The Blythe Collection Center reported that “all collections receipts were done incorrectly” from each of the four reporting precincts.

Report Group: Collection Center		Item: Riverside County Admin Center-Blythe	
Voting Precinct	Comment	Voting Precinct	Comment
0047005	X		
0047010	X		
0047011	X		
0047018	X		
Total Voting Pcts for: Riverside County Admin Center-Blythe 4			

all collection receipts done incorrectly

The Riverside County Administration Center (CAC) reported that over half of the incoming elections materials contained no bar codes or that the bar codes were covered. This bar code system, first implemented in the March 2007 Desert Hot Springs Election continues into its fourth election with significant problems, creating further erosion of the chain-of-custody and control.



Voting Precinct List by Report Group

Consolidated Primary Election - June 03, 2008

Report Group: Collection Center



Item: Riverside County Admin Center-Riverside

Voting Precinct	Comment	Voting Precinct	Comment	Voting Precinct	Comment
✓0011200	No Bar Code	✓0021312			
✓0011205		✓0021314	No Bar Code		
✓0011208		✓0021316	No Bar Code		
✓0011212	No Bar Code	✓0021318	No Bar Code		
✓0011214	No Bar Code	✓0021319			
✓0011301		✓0021320			
✓0011305					
✓0011307					
✓0011308	Bar Code Covered				
✓0011500	No Box 2 Bags + 1 Box				
✓0011501	Bar Code Covered				
✓0011502	No Bar Code				
✓0011504	Bar Covered				
✓0011507	No Bar Code				
✓0011510					
✓0011516	No Bar Code				
✓0011525	Bar Code Covered				
✓0011526					
✓0021108	Bar Code Covered				
0021111	No Bar Code				
✓0021113					
✓0021114	No Bar Code				
✓0021118					
✓0021120					
✓0021121	Bar Code Covered				
✓0021123					
✓0021125	No Bar Code				
✓0021301	No Bar Code				
✓0021304	No Bar Code				
✓0021305	No Bar Code				
✓0021309					
✓0021311					

Precinct 22851 appears to have violated the “two-person rule” when it was reported that only one individual showed up with all the elections materials.




Precinct 22851 – June 2008 Election. “Mr. Luna delivered to collection center alone.”

This is contrary to pg 93 of Election Officer Handbook which states “The Inspector and one officer of the precinct must transport the Voted and Unvoted paper ballot cartons, election materials Ballot Box, and the Red Transport Bag to the Collection Center. Both the Inspector and his/her assistant **must** ride in the same vehicle.”




VOTING PRECINCT <u>22851</u>	TIME RETURNED <u>10:05</u>
TO BE COMPLETED BY INSPECTOR	FOR COLLECTION CENTER STAFF USE
Inspector, confirm the following by completing the checklist before leaving the Polling Place.	Issue a copy of this signed and completed receipt upon your documented confirmation of the following:
I HAVE:	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Applied adhesive seal to the Voted Ballot Carton(s)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Voted Ballot Carton(s)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Applied adhesive seal to the Un-voted Ballot Carton(s)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Un-voted Ballot Carton(s)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enclosed (A-L, M-Z) Combined Roster and Index	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Roster flex test
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enclosed Provisional Voter Roster(s)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Red Bag sealed
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Applied seal to red bag	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Blue Ballot Box
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Blue Ballot Box with supplies	
 INSPECTOR SIGNATURE	As necessary indicate below:
<u>Robert Luna</u> INSPECTOR PRINT NAME	<input type="checkbox"/> Opened/Resealed red bag <u>MR LUNA</u>
<u>Patricia Starks</u> PRECINCT OFFICER SIGNATURE	<u>DELIVERED TO COLLECTION CENTER</u>
<u>Patricia Starks</u> PRECINCT OFFICER PRINT NAME	Notes: <u>LENOR ALONE, BALLOT</u>
	 COLLECTION CENTER STAFF SIGNATURE
Inspector, after completion of the checklist place this Election Collections	

Precinct 11111

Compromised Chain of Custody due to failure to confirm sealing of boxes of voted and unvoted ballots. Adding or removing ballots from unsealed ballot cartons could occur easily and without detection. Collection Center staff inappropriately accepted them without notation or explanation.

VOTING PRECINCT <u>11111</u>	TIME RETURNED <u>8:58</u>
TO BE COMPLETED BY INSPECTOR	FOR COLLECTION CENTER STAFF USE
Inspector, confirm the following by completing the checklist before leaving the Polling Place.	Issue a copy of this signed and completed receipt upon your documented confirmation of the following:
<i>I HAVE :</i>	
<input type="checkbox"/> Applied adhesive seal to the Voted Ballot Carton(s)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Voted Ballot Carton(s)
<input type="checkbox"/> Applied adhesive seal to the Un-voted Ballot Carton(s)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Un-voted Ballot Carton(s)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enclosed (A-L, M-Z) Combined Roster and Index	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Roster flex test
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enclosed Provisional Voter Roster(s)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Red Bag sealed
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Applied seal to red bag	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Blue Ballot Box
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Blue Ballot Box with supplies	As necessary indicate below:
 _____ INSPECTOR SIGNATURE	<input type="checkbox"/> Opened/Resealed red bag
<u>RAFFAEL DOMINNIK NOWDEN</u> _____ INSPECTOR PRINT NAME	Notes: _____
 _____ PRECINCT OFFICER SIGNATURE	 _____ COLLECTION CENTER STAFF SIGNATURE
<u>Ebony-Bianka Nowden</u> _____ PRECINCT OFFICER PRINT NAME	




At Precinct 11203, Inspector failed to complete the Election Collections Center document confirming items being delivered to Collection Center. Collection Center staff inappropriately accepted the document and signed off on their side of the form. This shows failure to adhere to good chain of custody principles and to comply with the ROV procedures.

<p>VOTING PRECINCT <u>11203</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">TO BE COMPLETED BY INSPECTOR</p> <p>Inspector, confirm the following by completing the checklist before leaving the Polling Place.</p> <p><i>I HAVE:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Applied adhesive seal to the Voted Ballot Carton(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Applied adhesive seal to the Un-voted Ballot Carton(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Enclosed (A-L, M-Z) Combined Roster and Index <input type="checkbox"/> Enclosed Provisional Voter Roster(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Applied seal to red bag <input type="checkbox"/> Blue Ballot Box with supplies <p>  <small>INSPECTOR SIGNATURE</small> <u>TOINYE WILLIAMS</u> <small>INSPECTOR PRINT NAME</small> </p> <p>  <small>PRECINCT OFFICER SIGNATURE</small> <u>Michael</u> <small>PRECINCT OFFICER PRINT NAME</small> </p>	<p style="text-align: right;">TIME RETURNED <u>8:50</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">FOR COLLECTION CENTER STAFF USE</p> <p>Issue a copy of this signed and completed receipt upon your documented confirmation of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Voted Ballot Carton(s) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Un-voted Ballot Carton(s) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Roster flex test <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Red Bag sealed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Blue Ballot Box <p>As necessary indicate below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Opened/Resealed red bag <p>Notes: _____</p> <p style="text-align: right;">  <small>COLLECTION CENTER STAFF SIGNATURE</small> </p>
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Precinct 14014 Election Collections Center document properly completed and signed by Inspector & staff & never validated by collection center staff.

<p>VOTING PRECINCT <u>14014</u></p> <p>TO BE COMPLETED BY INSPECTOR</p> <p>Inspector, confirm the following by completing the checklist before leaving the Polling Place.</p> <p>I HAVE:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Applied adhesive seal to the Voted Ballot Carton(s)<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Applied adhesive seal to the Un-voted Ballot Carton(s)<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enclosed (A-L, M-Z) Combined Roster and Index<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enclosed Provisional Voter Roster(s)<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Applied seal to red bag<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Blue Ballot Box with supplies <p>_____ INSPECTOR SIGNATURE <u>Cristina Sullivan</u> INSPECTOR PRINT NAME</p> <p>_____ PRECINCT OFFICER SIGNATURE <u>Susan J. McHugh</u> PRECINCT OFFICER PRINT NAME <u>Susan J. McHugh</u></p>	<p>TIME RETURNED _____:</p> <p>FOR COLLECTION CENTER STAFF USE</p> <p>Issue a copy of this signed and completed receipt upon your documented confirmation of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><input type="checkbox"/> Voted Ballot Carton(s)<input type="checkbox"/> Un-voted Ballot Carton(s)<input type="checkbox"/> Roster flex test<input type="checkbox"/> Red Bag sealed<input type="checkbox"/> Blue Ballot Box <p>As necessary indicate below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><input type="checkbox"/> Opened/Resealed red bag <p>Notes: _____</p> <p>_____ COLLECTION CENTER STAFF SIGNATURE</p>
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Precinct 52107 – Ending inventory of ballots not calculated (counted) due to “lack of time”. Apparent violation of EC 14405(a) “...officers receiving returned ballots shall compel this accounting.”

ELECTION COLLECTIONS RECEIPT	JUNE 3, 2008
VOTING PRECINCT <u>52107</u>	TIME RETURNED <u>11:00</u>
TO BE COMPLETED BY INSPECTOR	FOR COLLECTION CENTER STAFF USE
Inspector, confirm the following by completing the checklist before leaving the Polling Place.	Issue a copy of this signed and completed receipt upon your documented confirmation of the following:
I HAVE:	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Applied adhesive seal to the Voted Ballot Carton(s) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Applied adhesive seal to the Un-voted Ballot Carton(s) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enclosed (A-L, M-Z) Combined Roster and Index <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Enclosed Provisional Voter Roster(s) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Applied seal to red bag <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Blue Ballot Box with supplies	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Voted Ballot Carton(s) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Un-voted Ballot Carton(s) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Roster flex test <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Red Bag sealed <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Blue Ballot Box
 INSPECTOR SIGNATURE	As necessary indicate below:
EIMER N MARSHALL JR. INSPECTOR PRINT NAME	Notes: <u>Re calculate ending inv. Ran out of time. EM.</u>
 PRECINCT OFFICER SIGNATURE	 COLLECTION CENTER STAFF SIGNATURE
KC <u>Kirsten Cudde</u> PRECINCT OFFICER PRINT NAME	
Inspector, after completion of the checklist place this Election Collections Receipt into the precinct ID tag located on the handle of the red bag.	ECR Revised 04/02/2008

OBSERVATION:

7) The ROV eliminated the use of privacy sleeves in which vote-by-mail voters have traditionally placed their completed ballots prior to mailing to the ROV.

a) The use of these sleeves protected the identity of the voter and the particular votes he/she cast because the ROV worker who opened the envelope containing the sleeve would see the name of the voter on the envelope, but not the ballot itself. Another ROV worker would receive the sleeve without the envelope and process the ballot without learning the identity of the voter.

b) The compromise of the voters' anonymity by the elimination of the privacy sleeve violates assured-voter-privacy for over half of the voters in Riverside County and creates the opportunity for misuse of an ROV worker's knowledge of how voters cast their ballots. It depends on the worker "not looking", an almost unenforceable requirement, and one that a voter should not be subjected to, given the myriad of other violations by the ROV and staff in this report.

OBSERVATION:

8) On election night, workers at ROV headquarters often failed to record items that they received from the collection centers and began bringing in items in the back of the warehouse out of view of the public.

a) Without the required documentation of items received, it is not possible to account for the items that were sent from the collection centers to ROV headquarters.

b) Since these items included the ballots cast, both by paper and DRE, a very serious breach in the chain of custody results. The integrity of all elections is based on the ability to account for all ballots. To compromise that integrity because of a failure to complete a receipt form is completely unprofessional and unacceptable. If the form needs redesign, then redesign it.

c) When the volume of returning ballots and memory cards began to increase, the ROV staff abandoned the forms designed to account for what was being received. They ultimately resorted to hand writing the precinct numbers on a blank piece of paper,

which served no purpose other than to report that precinct “reported in”, but no notation of number of ballots, etc.

d) The thousands of unused ballots and other election materials were brought in the back of the warehouse where observers were prohibited, in violation of Election Code Section 15004 which requires that citizen observers view every aspect of the election process. There is yet to be any reconciliation released of the status of the tens of thousands of unused ballots, following a California Public Records Act request for such an accounting.

DOCUMENTATION:

NOTE

**THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS,
ENTITLED “ROV RECEIVING
CENTER” ARE RELATED TO THE
JUNE 3, 2008 ELECTION.**

**THE RIVERSIDE COUNTY
REGISTRAR OF VOTERS STATED
THAT THE DATE OF FEBRUARY 5TH,
2008 IS IN ERROR AND SHOULD BE
JUNE 3, 2008.**

The ROV Central Office received election materials from the 22 Collection Centers as they reported in on Election Night. That office began keeping track of incoming materials on the “ROV Receiving Center” logs (below) but fell behind as the night advanced. The forms below reflect a lack of full (or any) accounting for many of the precincts. The failing bar code system is seen as well as an example of recording of a missing results cartridge.

ROV Receiving Center

Consolidated Primary Election

February 5th, 2008

Row	ID	Status	Location	Time	Notes
1	11-104	<input type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County GAIN - Riverside		
2	11-111	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County GAIN - Riverside	10:06	
3	11-113	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County GAIN - Riverside	10:06	
4	11-115	<input type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County GAIN - Riverside		
5	11-200	<input type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County Admin Center-Riverside		
6	11-201	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County GAIN - Riverside	10:06	
7	11-203	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County GAIN - Riverside	10:06	
8	11-204	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County GAIN - Riverside	10:06	
9	11-205	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County Admin Center-Riverside	10:07	
10	11-208	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County Admin Center-Riverside	10:13	
11	11-210	<input type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County GAIN - Riverside		
12	11-212	<input type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County Admin Center-Riverside		
13	11-214	<input type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County Admin Center-Riverside		
14	11-218	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Registrar of Voters Office	9:41 PM	
15	11-219	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Registrar of Voters Office	9:47 PM	
16	11-222	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Registrar of Voters Office	9:10 PM	
17	11-224	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Registrar of Voters Office	9:48 PM	NO CARTRIDGE
18	11-225	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Registrar of Voters Office	9:29 PM	NO BARCODE
19	11-227	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Registrar of Voters Office	8:45 PM	
20	11-301	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County Admin Center-Riverside	10:08	
21	11-305	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County Admin Center-Riverside		
22	11-307	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County Admin Center-Riverside	10:10	
23	11-308	<input type="checkbox"/>	Riverside County Admin Center-Riverside		
24	11-402	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Registrar of Voters Office	9:02 PM	
25	11-404	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Registrar of Voters Office		
26	11-406	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Registrar of Voters Office	9:41 PM	NO BARCODE
27	11-408	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Registrar of Voters Office	9:36 PM	



Riverside County
Registrar of Voters

ROV Receiving Center

Consolidated Primary Election

February 5th, 2008

28	11-409	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0031	Registrar of Voters Office	9:22 PM	NO BARCODE
29	11-411	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0032	Registrar of Voters Office	9:51 PM	NO BARCODE
30	11-412	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0033	Registrar of Voters Office	9:35 PM	NO BARCODE
31	11-413	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0034	Registrar of Voters Office	9:56 PM	NO BARCODE
32	11-414	<input type="checkbox"/>	0035	Registrar of Voters Office		
33	11-415	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0036	Registrar of Voters Office	8:56 PM	NO BAR CODE
34	11-417	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0037	Registrar of Voters Office	9:13 PM	
35	11-418	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0038	Registrar of Voters Office	8:56 PM	NO BARCODE
36	11-419	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0039	Registrar of Voters Office	10:10	
37	11-420	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0040	Registrar of Voters Office	9:33 PM	
38	11-421	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0041	Registrar of Voters Office	9:28 PM	
39	11-422	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0042	Registrar of Voters Office	9:46 PM	
40	11-424	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0043	Registrar of Voters Office	9:32 PM	
41	11-428	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0044	Registrar of Voters Office	9:53 PM	NO BARCODE
42	11-429	<input type="checkbox"/>	0045	Registrar of Voters Office		
43	11-430	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0046	Registrar of Voters Office	9:04 PM	
44	11-431	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0047	Registrar of Voters Office	9:08 PM	
45	11-433	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0048	Registrar of Voters Office	9:26 PM	
46	11-434	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0049	Registrar of Voters Office	8:45 PM	NO BARCODE
47	11-436	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0050	Registrar of Voters Office	10:08	
48	11-442	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0051	Registrar of Voters Office	8:53 PM	
49	11-443	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0052	Registrar of Voters Office	9:56 PM	NO BARCODE
50	11-444	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0053	Registrar of Voters Office	8:49 PM	LOOSE BARCODE
51	11-500	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	0055	Riverside County Admin Center-Riverside		
52	11-501	<input type="checkbox"/>	0056	Riverside County Admin Center-Riverside		
53	11-502	<input type="checkbox"/>	0057	Riverside County Admin Center-Riverside		
54	11-504	<input type="checkbox"/>	0058	Riverside County Admin Center-Riverside		

Accounting for incoming precincts deteriorated to the point of simply recording precinct numbers on an untitled blank piece of paper as illustrated below.

	No Bar Code		
	42-029		
21963	42-020	21305	52328 40014
30070	42-851	21104	59854 40020
11953	14-908	21103	50810
11861	14-007	11211	52110 11714
40008	36-016	35863	52220
49024	36-035	35871	30006
11720	36-027	35854	30102
11620	36-003	35737	56923
40017	36-019	35769	11959
40013	11-414	21883 21883	56930
52307	32-904	52413	55619
11705	14-700	52500	30996
11624	36-040	58012	30680
41027	36-002	52207	22069
11605	40002	48870	55017
11702	49019	52107	22089
11902	49009	52105	11703
44019	40011 40011	58826	11700
42039	49005	52319	11521
41027	11516	33010	22826
42030	21121	52306 <i>Covered</i>	30092
11870	11104	52415	27677
55010	21872	58013	30096
59015	21852	52109	30115
49006	21-123	52219	30021
59021	21830	21959	22091
	21304	52405	49025
	11308	52334	

The aspect of this that is most disconcerting is that it deteriorated to this point during a very low turnout election. What will happen in November?

OBSERVATION:

- 9) **The ROV indicated an intention to erase the results cartridges of June election, thus preventing the “original” electronic votes from ever being audited.**
- a) Condition 27 requires that memory (results cartridges) be retained for the full election retention period when the chain of custody of any voting equipment has been compromised (and the chain of custody on all DREs has been compromised as demonstrated in this report).
 - b) The ROV should retain all results cartridges from the June election for the required 22 months required since the election included voting for a federal office (congressional primaries).

OBSERVATION:

- 10) **No copy of required Precinct results posting indicating number of ballots cast is sent to the ROV office as required by “Certification Condition 15”, thus giving no comparison number to check central tabulator numbers against.**
- a) The condition is clear that two transcription copies of the results must be made and signed by all poll workers and that one copy, plus the audit log of the DRE, must be returned to the ROV office.
 - b) ROV staff indicated no second copy of the results tape is made or retained.
 - c) Compliance with this requirement is another link in the critical chain-of-custody accountability for the ballots.

This concludes the 10 security chain-of-custody issues. The following additional areas of deficiency are provided as examples of significant instances of operational issues. They too require immediate attention, as a number of them reflect apparent non-compliance with one or more of the Conditional Certification requirements necessary to maintain certification of the entire Sequoia election system.

PART II
OPERATIONAL AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES

OBSERVATION:

11) Many polling places are not adequate to be designated as such because of deficiencies of size, location, parking, and safety.

a) Our review of written comments submitted by range inspectors and precinct personnel found common concern regarding the adequacy of many polling places. The foremost concern was that many polling places are too small and will present difficulties in a high-turnout election. They fear long lines, delays in voting, and compromise to the voting process, particularly in polling places where two precincts are housed. **This could result in actual voter disenfranchisement if the lines are too long and employment, child care, ill health, etc. require the voter to leave without casting a vote.**

b) Allied to this factor are complaints that many of the polling places must contend with loud noise (fire stations), conflicts with other activities in the same room (multi-purpose rooms in schools), accessibility and parking (strip malls), inclement weather consequences (residences and garages), and lack of privacy (retail and real estate offices). One range inspector complained **that precinct 50000 is a “fire trap”**.

OBSERVATION:

12) Poll Workers asked voters, or gave them the option to use the electronic voting machines—contrary to the intent of Conditional Certification Requirements.

a) The Secretary of State, in August 2007, decertified the use of Sequoia DREs. She permitted the use of one DRE per precinct to accommodate voters with disabilities. Such voters, at their volition, are permitted to vote on an electronic voting machine.

- b) In reviewing the written comments of the poll workers and the rangers, we noted several instances where poll workers solicited or encouraged a very high number of electronic votes.
- c) An analysis of the use of electronic voting machines reveals that high usage (over 20 votes) occurred in 85 of the 720 precincts. Within the count of 85 precincts, 34 precincts registered over 50 electronic ballots and 5 precincts recorded over 100 electronic ballots cast. The number of precincts reporting high DRE usage has decreased significantly from February. **Those 85 precincts, however, still inexplicably appear to be out of compliance with at least the intent the limitation on use of the DREs.**
- d) Instructions from the ROV are for the poll workers not to encourage electronic voting. We saw no evidence of follow-up by the ROV on violations of this issue.
- e) A large poster stating the DREs are available upon request, was mutually agreed upon by the ROV and SRV to negate verbal offerings by the workers. In as much as many sites continued to verbally offer the DREs, we would request that the sign no longer be posted and workers be reminded again to not offer DREs.

OBSERVATION:

- 13) To protect the voter's anonymity, Condition 1 of the state Conditional Re-Approval document requires if one person uses a DRE, that four additional voters be directed to use the DRE as well, resulting in a minimum of 5 DRE ballots cast. In 61 instances, documented by SAVE R VOTE from ROV reports, the number of votes cast on DREs failed to meet this requirement, potentially exposing the identity of the voter. This requirement must be strictly enforced for voter privacy.

OBSERVATION:

- 14) **Many poll workers (19 that were documented) were absent without notice or authorization on Election Day.**

- a) Poll workers who fail to appear without proper notice present serious problems for the precinct inspector and the other poll workers. The work load expected for the November General election will be much higher than it was for the February of June primary elections. All staff will be needed, without exception. Many of the problem areas that we have discussed result, at least in part, from workload issues.

OBSERVATION:

- 15) **No Criminal background checks are performed on poll workers**, precinct inspectors or range inspectors. Yet a recent TV investigation in Pittsburg, PA showed 13 precinct inspectors with total control of their precinct had felony convictions. Recommendations to conduct DOJ/NCIC background checks have gone unheeded in Riverside County.

OBSERVATION:

- 16) **The “Yellow Button” remains as vulnerable as ever**, notwithstanding the purchase of a flexible yellow cover that is placed around and over the button, with a hook for a plastic seal. No seals have ever been used to secure the cover. In addition, the cover itself may be inadequately secured to the voting unit. This button allows a voter to vote repeatedly until restrained.

OBSERVATION:

- 17) **Central tabulator viewing did not meet requirements of condition 24 of certification**
 - a) While external monitors were set up for public viewing of the activities of the six Optec 400C scanners, there was no external monitor set up for viewing the activities on the central tabulator.
 - b) The public has a right to view “any and all phases of the election process”; this definitely includes the tabulation of ballots cast which is the essential activity of the election process.

- c) Since the ROV prohibits (at her discretion) any observers in the central tabulator room, the central tabulator external monitor is the only vehicle observers have to view this critical activity. This should be installed immediately.

OBSERVATION:

18) Observers were in several instances precluded from “lawful meaningful observation” and threatened with removal for “interfering” with a process.

- a) Condition 14 requires that upon request, members of the public must be permitted to observe and inspect, without physical contact, the integrity of all externally visible security seals used to secure voting equipment in a time and manner that does not interfere with the conduct of the election or the privacy of any voter.
- b) The ROV has prohibited observers from going behind voting machines to check seals in direct violation of this Condition.
- c) Some observers at collection centers were threatened with removal and arrest for simply attempting to videotape the activities and attempting to confirm the various processes.
- d) Some observers were prohibited from observing the closing process at various precincts, thus violating Election Code Section 15004 et seq.
- e) There has been some progress in this area and we encourage the ROV to urge all precinct staff to cooperate fully.

OBSERVATION:

19) Condition 19 requires the vendor (Sequoia) to reimburse the county for any post-election auditing requirements imposed as a result of the certification. Riverside County has not billed nor received any reimbursement for these costs. These costs should be identified and billed for both the February and June elections, as well as future elections.

CONCLUSION

The above discussed deficiencies resulted from the failure of poll workers, precinct and range inspectors, collection center personnel, and ROV staff to follow and complete security and chain-of-custody procedures that are prescribed by County and/or State laws and procedures.

Whether this owes to inadequate training, ineffective supervision, or understaffing, we leave to others to consider. We believe, however, that it is imperative that all appropriate steps be implemented to resolve these deficiencies before Riverside County faces a voting crisis and possible decertification. With a very high voter turnout being highly likely for November, our election system must operate at peak level of proficiency and full legal compliance.

The Secretary of State in August 2007 decertified all Sequoia DREs and the high speed Sequoia 400C scanners used to scan and tabulate the count of paper ballots. She then immediately recertified the use of the 400C scanners and one DRE per precinct conditioned on the County's compliance with a list of 41 security and operational standards. In a letter dated October 2, 2007, the Secretary of State advised ROV Dunmore that “...**the process of complying with the conditions imposed in the recertification order is ongoing ... and will only be revisited should it be determined the conditions are not being met.**”

Given the significant security and chain-of-custody lapses documented in this review, it appears the county must immediately implement strict controls to retain “conditional certification” of the entire Sequoia voting system, which includes the Sequoia Optec 400C high speed programmable scanners.

A separate report specifically related to apparent violations of the conditions of certification is attached as an added reference.